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The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) longstanding Doha Round has continued to be 
under discussion for over ten years.  Negotiations between the developing coalitions and 
developed countries began during the September 2003 Cancun Ministerial Conference.  Since 
the Doha talks began, the number of such agreements has doubled to over two hundred 
worldwide, as of 2011.
1
  As a result of stalled ten year negotiations, political will and support for 
a strong multilateral deal has eroded.  The United States and the European Union have 
aggressively pursued the majority of regional and bilateral trade agreements.  These agreements 
exclude the vast majority of developing nations.  A multilateral deal would have a greater 
contribution to global economic growth, especially in regards to developing nations, than any 
existing regional agreement.   
The Doha Round trade talks is the longest continuous trade negotiation in WTO history.   
Among the twenty one subjects of the Doha agreement is the Agreement on Agriculture.   The 
agriculture industry accounts for significant financial gains to developing nation’s economies.  
Representatives of developing nations have persistently worked towards an agreement because 
ultimately the cost of no agreement would be high and have greater consequences than a 
stalemate.
2
  The WTO is one of the most recognized international institutions throughout the 
world.  Its members represent the disparate parts of the international community and bring them 
together under a common goal:  A multilateral agriculture framework that benefits all 
members.  The Doha Round is focused on the international trade of agriculture, an industry that 
every country relies on to supply food to its people and contributes to the economy.  The fact that 
there is yet to be a multilateral agriculture agreement demonstrates the complexity of the issues 
and how crucial agriculture is to national and international economies.  
The only way to move forward is to operate under a new formula that addresses problems 
within market access, special treatment, the “single-undertaking” and the Singapore Issues.   In 
this study, I examine the negotiation dynamics between three developing country coalitions, the 
Cotton-4, the G-33 and the G-90, and two developed countries, the United States and the 
European Union in the four issue-areas mentioned above.   My hypothesis states that if and only 
if the three developing country coalitions and the two developed countries offer specific 
adjustments to the WTO agenda will there be a successful outcome to the negotiations.  
Putnam’s theory of ratification and two-level games is applied to identify these specific 
concessions that maximize win-sets.   
Twelve years later, the Doha agreement is still on the table.  The differences in interest 
have been vast and negotiations have been long.  So why, even after the many years of 
disagreement that’s led to an inability to collaborate interests between developed and developing 
nations, should Doha continue to be negotiated?  At the 2008 address to the General Council in 
Geneva, former WTO Director-General Lamy stated "looking at what is on the table now, 
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Glossary of Terms 
ACP – Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific  
AGOA - Africa Growth and Opportunity Act  
AoA – Agreement on Agriculture 
C-4 – Coalition Group of Exporting Cotton Nations in the WTO 
CCG – Country Commercial Guide 
COA – Committee on Agriculture in the WTO 
Cotton USA – The National Cotton Council of America 
DDR – Doha Declaration Round 
DDA - Doha Declaration Agenda 
EPAs - Economic Partnership Agreements 
FTA- Free Trade Agreement 
GATT – General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
G-33 – The Group of 33 members in the WTO 
G-90 – The Group of 90 members in the WTO 
LDC – Least Developed Countries  
NAMA – Non-Agriculture Market Access 
RTA- Regional Trade Agreement 
SP - Strategic Products  
SSG - Special Safeguard  
SSM - Special Safeguard Mechanisms  
S&D – Special and Differential Treatment 
USTR – United States Trade Representative 
WACIP - West Africa Cotton Improvement Program  






Chapter 1: Introduction 
The focus of this study is the negotiating dynamic of the World Trade Organization’s 
(WTO) failed Doha Round.  In this thesis, I will examine the negotiations between developing 
country coalitions that formed during Doha and the developed nations which generally had an 
opposing agenda.  I will review the formal and informal negotiations starting with the September 
2003 Cancun Ministerial up to the discussion surrounding the ministerial that took place at the 
end of 2012.  The Cancun Ministerial was the fifth WTO Ministerial and the second to discuss 
the Doha agenda.
4
 Cancun is historically known for abruptly ending in failure when the 
developing countries walked out in protest at developed countries’ resistance to trade 
negotiations in agriculture.
5
    
The Doha agreement resulted from the Doha, Qatar Ministerial Meeting in 2001 and 
established the parameters of the Doha Round.  The issues touched upon in the agreement had 
initially been discussed at the Seattle Ministerial Summit in 1999 but those discussions failed.
6
  
The Doha agreement addressed fifteen trade-related issues.  It remains a topic of negotiations, 
particularly focusing on agriculture. Problems with the current agreement were soon introduced 
by developing nations which argued that their interests were not equally represented in the 
agreement.  The uneven impacts of opening market access, mostly affecting developing nations, 
had not been dealt with by the agreement.  Since then, there has been little progress made in 
determining what feasible concessions can be made to maximize each side’s “win-sets.”   
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In order for any negotiations to be successful, the negotiating parties must arrive at an 
arrangement that allows both international and domestic needs to be met.
7
  My hypothesis is that 
only if the coalitions of the developing nations as well as United States and the European Union 
individually offer specific adjustments to the WTO agenda will there be a successful outcome to 
the negotiations.  Without concessions from both sides, an ultimate agreement is not possible.  
The purpose of investigating the hypothesis is to ultimately determine what concessions each 
side can offer.  I will explore this by first analyzing the negotiations to date between developing 
nations and developed nations on the assumption that level I (international) and level II 
(domestic) negotiators have been unable to satisfy domestic constituents and thus further 
concessions are needed before an agreement can be reached.  I will use Robert D. Putnam's 
model of the two-level game to suggest a successful formula for international agriculture 
negotiations.   
The concept of win-sets will be used as a means of identifying possible concessions.  An 
examination of win-sets and their varying sizes will be significant to supporting the hypothesis 
and offering recommended concessions.  According to Putnam, a win-set is defined as the set of 
all possible Level I agreements that would allow for a win, or the approval of the necessary 
majority of domestic constituents.  This set of possible agreements permits negotiators to gain 
the majority needed to reach an agreement at Level II.  The concept is not original to Putnam, but 
his definition is the most applicable for this analysis.
8
  Win-sets can deliver either maximum or 
minimum gains.  The hypothesis aims to depict outcomes that deliver maximum win-sets for 
each side’s domestic and international participants.  It also suggests that the current state of 
negotiations offer minimum or no win-sets which have led to the lack of agreement.   
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This topic was selected for three reasons:  the duration of negotiations - it is the longest 
continuous trade negotiation in WTO history; the implications that follow failed trade talks for 
the WTO; and the significance of the agriculture industry to the economies of developing 
nations.  The next Ministerial Meeting for Doha will occur in December 2012.  Not only is this 
issue very timely, but time is also running out to reach an agreement.  Many who have studied 
the evolution of Doha believe that developing nations will be worse off if the agreement fails.
9
   
My hypothesis accepts the complexity of interactions between the domestic and 
international levels.  It recognizes the obstacles to international cooperation and the inclination 
that states have to first serve their own interests.  International organizations are meant to 
facilitate cooperation.  Forming coalitions has become the preferred and most effective strategy 
of developing nations hoping to have their interests implemented in multilateral agreements.  The 




Before an international treaty can be agreed upon, all participants’ interests must be 
equally represented.  Theorists would argue that representation is a fixed unavoidable matter of 
power.
11
  As a multilateral institution, the WTO has an obligation to pursue equal representation 
of all nations.  The lack of progress has allowed WTO negotiations to be bypassed in favor of a 
host of pending bilateral trade negotiations – an unfavorable result for an institution whose sole 
function is to facilitate global trade agreements.  If the WTO is unable to efficiently handle 
negotiations, this reflects poorly on the international organization’s ability to enhance 
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Negotiations can be especially problematic in the multilateral sphere, given that all 
nations need to first gain support at the domestic level.  Promoting a multilateral agenda can be 
complicated when national interest and policies appear to oppose this agenda.  Multilateralism in 
international trade refers to trade organized on the basis of certain principles of state conduct, 
and above all, non-discrimination.  It refers to the coordination of relations among three or more 
states in accordance with certain shared principles.
12
  Early into Doha, developing nations had 
very little bargaining power when acting alone.  Nations recognized that acting together on 
common interest issues could increase their bargaining power.   Thus, coalition building among 
developing nations began as a strategy to increase their win-sets in the negotiations.   
Coalitions have proven to offer developing nations a stronger voice in negotiations.
13
 
Though this increases their bargaining leverage, coalitions still need to offer concessions to reach 
ratification.  Similarly, developed nations seeking agreement with developing nations need to do 
so as well. Furthermore, both developed and developing nations have to work within the context 
of domestic as well as international positions.  Robert Putnam’s two-level dynamic is thus an 
appropriate framework to use in the search for success in multilateral negotiations.
14
 
Over the years, many have watched and waited to see whether an agreement will be 
reached.  In this thesis I examine the positions of the developing country coalitions (the Cotton-
4, the G-33, and the G-90) as well as the United States and the European Union.   
The Cotton-4 is the coalition that formed as a result of the dispute over market access for 
West African nations’ profitable cotton industry.  The cotton dispute emerged in 2003 as a major 
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issue for developing countries.  It became part of the agenda for the Cancun Ministerial.  
Negative effects of cotton subsidies were most profound in areas of West Africa, including Chad, 
Benin, Mali, and Burkina Faso.  Together, these countries comprise the C-4 group of cotton-
exporting nations.  In this area of the world, cotton is their specialization.  At that time, profits 
from cotton made up five to ten percent of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and more than 
sixty percent of their exports.
15
  Cotton subsidies have become a prominent issue because of the 
negative impact on development.  The initiative therefore called attention to the impact of 
foreign cotton subsidies on West African cotton farmers, and proposed that cotton be considered 
a special product for developing countries.  In addition, the C-4 demanded that all developed 
nation cotton subsidies be phased-out and ultimately eliminated.  During the “phase-out” period, 
the initiative proposed that all four nations be financially reimbursed.
16
  Such demands would 
prove very difficult for developed nations to ratify. 
The cotton initiative was unprecedented in two ways: first, it was the first emanating 
from a group of least developed countries;
17
  second, it was the first time that the WTO dealt 
with a financial compensation issue rather than the typical remedy of authorizing 
countermeasures.
18
  The cotton dispute continued into the eighth Ministerial Meeting of Doha.   
Although there are many other countries with unsubsidized cotton sectors, the impacts 
are less severe.  However, additional disputes in cotton have occurred between Brazil and the 
United States.  Brazil brought a case against the U.S. to the Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
(DSM) of the WTO seeking to legally obligate the U.S. to reduce cotton subsidies that had a 
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negative impact on the Brazilian cotton sector.  The case was ultimately ruled in Brazil’s favor in 
April 2010.  In addition to imposing legal obligations, the rulings of the case have affected the 
United States position on C-4 cotton negotiations and their willingness to offer concessions. 
The G-33 coalition was formed on the issue of Strategic Products (SP) and the Special 
Safeguard Mechanisms (SSM) and was originally known as the Alliance on SP and SSM or the 
Friends of the SP and SSM.
19
  Strategic, or otherwise called Special Products, are defined by the 
G-33 as products important for food security, farmers’ livelihoods and rural development, that 
should be subjected to special and differential treatment that allows for no or low tariff 
reductions.
20
 The basic principle of Special and Differential (S&D) is the differential treatment, 
or “non-reciprocity,” of developing nations in terms of formula cuts and tariff reductions.  Under 




The group was led by the Philippines and Indonesia and aimed to protect some of their 
specialty products, somewhat similarly to the cotton initiative.  The G-33 had sixteen members at 
the time of foundation.  Its evolved to thirty-three members by September of 2003 and taken the 
name of G-33.  The group now has forty-six members.
22
   
The Special Safeguard Mechanism is applied under the Market Access pillar of the 
agreement.  Its purpose is to protect against sudden fluctuations in world prices or import surges 
from non-tariff barriers.  Import restrictions and countervailing duties are a right, and in some 
form a necessity for survival, as the Philippines has proposed.
23
   The coalition was formed to 
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bargain for the use of non-tariff barriers as a protectionist method to limit imports from 
developed nations.    
Many of the coalition’s members still have large rural populations composed of small and 
resource-poor farmers with limited access to infrastructure and few employment alternatives. 
Rice production in the Philippines, for example, provides employment and income for an 
estimated two million farmers, twenty percent of the agricultural work force.
24
   As a result, 
import prices became distorted to match locally-produced rice prices.
25
  This caused many 
domestic mechanisms that protected rice farmers from cheap rice imports to be reduced or 
eliminated.  It became cheaper to source rice from one single transnational commodity trader 
abroad instead of the many small-scale rice producers.
26
  Rice is one of the products that the 
coalition proposed should be protected as a Special Product.  Intra-coalition support between G-
33 and G-90 has furthered the promotion of SP and SSM in the negotiations. 
The G-90 is by far the largest of the three coalitions.  It is the largest coalition involved in 
the agreement.   Three previously established developing country coalitions came together in the 
midst of Cancun.  Initially, the goal of the G-90 was to prevent the adoption of The Singapore 
Issues (see below) into the Doha Declaration.  Over the years, its demands have developed into 
three main points:  the Singapore Issues, the “single-undertaking” agenda and special and 
differential treatment. 
The Singapore Issues were formed in response to the Uruguay Round and only one year 
after the WTO had been established.  They are known as the Singapore Issues as they were 
introduced at the Singapore Ministerial in 1996.  The Singapore issues have evolved to 
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encompass four aspects:  they are investment, competition policy, government procurement and 
trade facilitation.
27
 The first three are non-trade issues which have led to disagreement as to 
whether or not non-trade issues should be allowed to be negotiated as subjects of treaties in the 
WTO, a trade-specific organization. Evidently, the fourth issue is related to trade, and the debate 
here has been on whether there should be binding multilateral rules in the WTO on this 
issue.  By the time of the Doha Ministerial, members were still at odds on whether or not 
negotiations on the Singapore Issues should take place at this time.
28
  Developed countries at 
Doha supported the inclusion of the Singapore Issues.  The developing countries contested that 
the priority of Doha was to correct the imbalances caused by the implementations of the Uruguay 
Round.  They believed the Singapore Issues should be negotiated outside of Doha, and possibly, 
of the WTO.   
Though they agreed to the trade facilitation issue, the G-90 prevented the inclusion of the 
first three Singapore issues into the negotiations.  The African, Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP), 
Least Developed Countries (LDC) and African Group aligned (along with some non-WTO 
members) and collectively came to be the G-90.
29
   The G-90 campaigned against a variety of 
issues both related to agriculture and the declaration itself.  Although the addition of The 
Singapore Issues was the catalyst that brought the G-90 together, the group also collaborated in 
favor of the C-4 and G-33’s cause for the special and differential treatment of developing 
countries.
30
 The final issue of concern for the G-90 was the single-undertaking discipline that the 
Doha Declaration Round, or DDR, employed. The single-undertaking refers to the manner in 
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which a treaty is applied, that is in its entirety.  The single-undertaking is elaborated under the 
agreement in Chapter 3. 
The positions of the three developing country coalitions and the opposing participants, 
the United States and the European Union, will be examined in detail in Chapter 3 as well.  But 
first, the research design with supporting literature is presented at length in the next chapter.   
I will identify the current bargaining strategies of each player and the possible areas of 
concessions that can be made by each side.  Concessions will make agreement more likely.  This 
analysis is meant to offer a deeper understanding of successful negotiation formulas in complex 
multilateral settings.  If the Doha agenda and Agreement on Agriculture continue to be impeded 
and outnumbered by regional agreements, developing nations will be the ones most adversely 




























Chapter 2: Research Design and Literature 
Research Design 
 
 My hypothesis is that only if the coalitions of the developed nations and developing 
nations both offer specific concessions (which I will detail) to the Doha agenda will there be a 
successful outcome to the negotiations.  I attempt to support my hypothesis by examining the 
behavior of the three global south coalitions, the Cotton-4, the G-33 and the G-90, as well as the 
United States and the European Union in the negotiations.  The coalitions’ demands which I will 
look at are in regard to market access, special and differential treatment the single-undertaking 
and the Singapore Issues.  I will examine the five Ministerial Conferences where negotiations 
have taken place from 2003 to 2012.    
I will use Robert D. Putnam’s two-level game approach as an overarching framework.  I 
plan to assess the possible win-sets that can bring about domestic as well as international 
agreement on all sides. In doing so, I can identify areas of possible concessions and ultimately 
offer a solution for a positive outcome.  The coalitions of developing nations within the Doha 
negotiations and their bargaining strategies will be assessed followed by the position of the 
United States and the European Union.  Then, I will identify concessions that both sides will 
need to offer in order to satisfy domestic interests necessary for ratification and in turn necessary 
to reach agreement at the international level. 
International relations scholars employ “levels of analysis” as a way to approach a 
problem.  In some cases, scholars examine only the interaction of states at the international level.  
Others look at the roles of interest and political groups at the domestic level. These two levels of 
analysis provide insight as to how decisions are shaped.  Within each level, decision-making may 





 A comprehensive understanding of the Doha negotiations necessitates an examination of both 
these levels.   
 
Literature 
Realism and liberalism maintain one common theoretical assumption that underlies my 
hypothesis.  Both perspectives assume that states are rational and act in their self-interest.  The 
concepts examined are concerned with cooperation and question if states are capable of doing so.  
Finally, both realism and liberalism address gains, or a maximization of utility and how states 
make decisions in regards to absolute or relative gains.  
Relative gains and absolute gains refer to the way in which individual actors will evaluate 
decision-making in trade agreements and achieve gains within the international community.
31
  
The distinct difference between the two is the recipient of the gains.  Absolute gains consider the 
total effect of the decision while relative gains primary concern is the individual gains.
32
  For 
example, a nation might choose the overall win internationally (absolute) or may arrange an 
agreement in a manner that benefits them more than another country for the sake of achieving 
higher gains relative to others (relative.)  The realist position is that relative gains are most 
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Realism, Liberalism, and Game Theory 
Realism is skeptical of the ability of institutions to foster cooperation.  In a realist world, 
all nations are distrustful and their main priority is to maintain or increase their relative power.
33
  
In other words, states would not normally cooperate because this would be against their self-
interest and goal of power maximization.
34
 Neorealist Joseph Grieco argues against the 
importance of institutions.  Since states always seek a relative advantage, cooperation is only 
used to ensure relative gains. Grieco addresses the liberal concept of cheating.  Although he 
agrees that there is an incentive to cooperate to prevent cheating, he finds that these incentives do 
not address the fact that states are going to act to their relative advantage.  Grieco believes that 
institutional environments encourage opposition instead of cooperation.
35
   
Liberalism offers a contrasting perspective on trade as a facilitator of cooperation.  
Unlike realism, liberalists believe that cooperation and collaboration can occur under anarchy.
36
  
Liberalist Richard Cobden examines the influence free trade has on peace and cooperation.  
According to Cobden, an expansion in free trade would expand contact, communication and 
relationships among nations.  This perspective proposes that economic interdependence would 
positively alter international peace.  Further support for liberal trade theories’ effects on peace 
comes from Jon Stuart Mill and Schumpeter.  Schumpeter promotes commercial interest in 
protecting and expanding capital.  Peace, he believes, is served by the spread of capitalism.   
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Game theory is concerned with how collaboration among competitive states can be 
achieved by means of either relative or absolute gains.  This theory begins by accepting anarchy.  
Characteristics of anarchy include a lack of trust, the need for self-help, and the centrality of the 
national interest.  State competition results in zero-sum games, where a state gains all or loses 
all, or non-zero sum games, where all states can gain or lose in different degrees.
37
  Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau’s interpretation of relative and absolute gains is played out in his example of a stag 
hunt.  The stag hunt offers the choices that states are faced with in regard to cooperation.  States 
may collaborate in hunting the stag, or out of distrust, states will defect from the group and 
attempt to capture the hare.  The latter would serve self-interest at the expense of the group.  This 
story is meant to reveal that self-interest precludes collaboration.  Collaborative efforts in the 
Doha negotiations have so far been precluded and the current outcome resembles Rousseau’s 
portrayal of the stag hunt.
38
  
Subsidy reform is a great example of the stag hunt in Doha negotiations.  Assuming that 
reducing subsidies to benefit developing nations will deliver massive long term economic 
benefits for all, the outcome would be equivalent to the communal stag.  Individual countries, 
however, may well see the comparative advantage to be gained from maintaining current policies 
on subsidies and take this as their hare. 
There are several variations to game theory.  The deadlock that has occurred in the 
negotiations can be further explained by the idea of zero-sum games. Zero-sum games are often 
played within international organizations.  Zero-sum games also occur regularly in domestic 
negotiations. When two parties are most concerned with relative gains, their relations can be 
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modeled as a zero-sum game.  Realist scholars believe that states’ focus on relative gains will 
have an inhibitive effect on international cooperation.
39
 
The Doha Round’s fate has been uncertain.   States that committed to making changes in 
the Doha Round in the past have not done so.  States are revealing themselves to be capable of 
going against their commitments.  Realism helps explain this uncertainty.    
 
Liberalism  
Liberal trade theory makes the assumption that free trade results in gains for all nations.  
Free trade is the opening of global market access by reducing barriers to entry.  The free trade 
framework is primarily favored by developed nations capable of competing globally.  The 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was initially promoted by the U.S.; other 
developed countries quickly followed.  Developing countries have been at the forefront of the 
free trade agenda and continually press other nations to transition into a liberal free trade system. 
By liberalizing the economies of developing countries, these countries would stand to 
gain increased profits which are inaccessible under protectionist barriers.  Developed nations see 
lucrative opportunities in removing barriers to trade, such as duties and tariffs.  Agricultural 
products, for instance, are generally the main revenue producer of developing countries and the 
principal industry being debated in the Doha agreement.  Developing nations may seek to protect 
their primary markets rather than allow increased competition by opening markets to foreign 
nations.  The principles of free liberal trade conflict with protectionism making it difficult to 
establish a trading system that has uniform outcomes for all.   
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The WTO is considered a liberal international trade organization which is founded on 
market-oriented principles rather than authoritative.  The basic characteristics of liberal trade are 
that barriers to trade, such as tariffs, should be reduced and eventually eliminated.  Liberalization 
of trade is considered an agenda of developed nations.   
Market-oriented regimes tend to focus on economic growth.  Developed nations have 
been adamant in their interest to pursue liberalization, or the opening of markets and reduction of 
barriers.  Developing countries are less inclined to accept liberalization of their markets because 
it does not result in economic gains.   
 
Two-level Games:  The Domestic and International Level 
Robert Putnam’s two-level game analysis can be used to understand trade negotiations 
and the ways in which the two levels interact.  In simplest terms, the two-level games approach 
is an attempt to explain why some negotiations reach an agreement and why others fail.  Through 
two-level theory Putnam attempts to provide a formula for a successful agreement in a complex 
environment.   Bargaining strategies, degree of bargaining power, and possible win-sets are also 
explained under Putnam’s two-level game approach. 
Putnam identifies a theory of ratification that is important to understanding the two-level 
games.  Ratification can only occur after a treaty has been agreed upon.  Simply agreeing to the 
terms or even becoming a signatory of a treaty does not solidify obligation by law.  Ratification 
is significant because of its legality.  The first requirement to ratification is agreement.  Once 
agreed upon, a state establishes its consent to be bound by a treaty and bound to the other 





Ratification is the final step taken to authorize an agreement.  The contracting parties 
have the chance to weigh and consider their options under the proposed agreement, but once it is 
ratified it becomes law.  Once a country ratifies an international agreement, the treaty becomes 
national law.  A country that is apprehensive about ratifying an international treaty is probably 
concerned about altering their national law.   
Failed ratification is explained by voluntary defection and involuntary defection.  
Voluntary defection is the backing out by a rational actor or actors resulting in no agreement.  
Involuntary defection refers to the behavior of a negotiator who is unable to deliver on a promise 
in the absence of ratification.  Acknowledging this limitation, negotiators will typically only 
commit to promises they are able to deliver on.  This is what one would call “deliverability”.   
The smaller the win- set the greater the risk of involuntary defection.  However, a small domestic 
win- set can be a bargaining advantage. 
The two-level game operates between the domestic level and international level.  The 
first level is the international negotiation.  The second level contains such participants as political 
groups and domestic legislations which can influence agreement.   
At the first level, national governments will seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy 
domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments.
40
  The 
chief negotiators are the main actors in the level I negotiations.  Typically, chief negotiators are 
trade representatives or Ambassadors to their national governments.  The chief negotiator has a 
great deal of influence on negotiations and acts as a liaison between international, or level I, and 
domestic, or level II negotiators.   
At the second level, political groups and domestic legislation often influence the 
domestic level negotiators.  Reaching a level II agreement is difficult in a multilateral 






negotiation.   It is crucial to first reach a level II agreement; without it, the level I agreement 
cannot happen.  Domestic groups put pressure on government to adopt favored policies.  
Domestic politics are going to influence the acceptability of an agreement.
41
   Interest groups 
often pressure constituents and governments to adopt their policies.   
National political leaders appear in both games.  Chief negotiators represent both levels.  
The chief negotiator is the only formal link between Level I and Level II.  A move that generates 
a positive response on the international level may not receive the same response on the domestic 
level.  According to Putnam, a negotiator seeks an agreement that will be positively received by 
his domestic constituents.
42
  A chief negotiator understands that all international agreements 
require the approval of the domestic constituents.  Gaining domestic approval should be the 
priority of chief negotiators who wish to move forward with any international agreement.   
Analytically, there are two stages to the negotiation process:  First, bargaining occurs 
between the negotiators and is meant to lead to a tentative agreement.  This is called the Level I 
negotiation.  The second stage remains separate from the international negotiators.  Each group 
of constituents will meet and discuss the possibility of ratification.  This is referred to as Level II 
negotiation.
43
         
 Ratification at Level II may require a formal voting process that complies with domestic 
procedures, such as an electoral majority common to democracies.  Different political systems 
vary widely in terms of their ratification requirements.  Putnam uses the two-thirds majority 
needed for the U.S. Senate to ratify a treaty as an example of a complex level II voting process.  
When an extensive procedure for approval is required, ratification becomes increasingly 
difficult. 










Win-sets are the set of all possible Level I agreements that would allow for a win, or a 
favorable outcome needed to gain constituents approval.  A win-set includes every conceivable 
arrangement that may lead to an agreement.  Win-sets can be essential to creating an agreement 
that satisfies both levels because a win-set can alter the bargaining power of the level I and level 
II negotiators.   
 
Win-sets 
A win-set is the area in which the interests or concerns of the two negotiating parties 
intersect.  Win-sets can be measured by their maximum or minimum gains at level I and II.  In 
two- level games, the size of the win- set is important because the relative size of the respective 
Level II win- sets will affect the distribution of the joint gains from international bargaining.  
The larger the win-set is, the greater the chances are that an agreement will be ratified.  In 
contrast, a smaller win-set is likely to produce the opposite results.
44
 
In larger win-sets, the areas where interests intersect are greater and in turn the possibility 
of reaching an agreement is greater.  Therefore, larger win-sets will produce maximum gains for 
each country from an agreement.  On the other hand, smaller win-sets produce minimum 
outcomes.  Smaller win-sets have a greater chance of failure because there are fewer areas of 
intersected interests.  Examining win-set sizes in the Doha negotiations can help to determine 
why ratification has yet to occur.  In addition, understanding the determinants of win-set size will 
aid in revealing possible concessions.  Putnam’s theory identifies three determinants of win-set 
size:  the level II preferences and coalitions, the level II political institutions and the strategy of 
the level I negotiators.  
The first determinant of win-set size is level II preferences and coalitions.  In order to 
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demonstrate the interactive nature of the two levels of negotiations, one must accept that Level II 
actors influence the decisions of Level I negotiators.  To reiterate, domestic politics influence 
decision-making in a profound way.   
In the case of Doha, there is a high cost of no-agreement for developing nations and a low 
cost for the developed.
 45  
The proposals brought forward by developing coalitions require 
developed countries to make extreme concessions and exceptions.  In addition, many developed 
nations, such as the U.S. and the EU have bilateral agreements that serve their interests in lieu of 
Doha. 
The second determinant of the size of a win-set depends on the Level II 
political institutions. These institutions include the country’s ratification procedures that can 
influence the size of their win-set.  The greater the autonomy of the central decision- makers 
from their Level II constituents the larger the win- set.  The larger the win-set is, the greater the 
likelihood negotiations have to achieve an international agreement.   The stronger the state is in 
terms of autonomy from domestic pressure, the weaker its relevant bargaining position 
internationally. 
The U.S. separation of powers imposes a tighter constraint on the American win-sets than 
is true in many other countries.  This increases the U.S. chief negotiator’s bargaining power, but 
decreases the possibilities for cooperative agreements to be approved by Level II.   
The U.S Farm Bill is the primary national agricultural policy.  It is approved by Congress 
every five years.  The farm bill was first launched in 1973 and deals with such topics as 
commodity pricing, trade, and domestic agriculture subsidies.
46
  Many of the domestic subsidies 
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within the bill expire in 2013.
47
  The domestic subsidy programs mandated by the farm bills 
complicate the negotiations for Doha as the chief negotiators will be inundated with domestic 
incentives. 
For the European Union, all methodologies relating to agriculture trade are determined 
under the Common Agriculture Policy, or CAP.
48
   The EU CAP came into effect in 1962 under 
the European Commission. The CAP comprises all agriculture policy of the EU including import 
tariffs and price support mechanisms for subsidies.
49
  The policy gives direct aid to farmers, 
rather than using subsidies, which allows for less distortion.
50
  In regard to the Doha agenda, the 
EU claims to aim the CAP at reducing distortions in the world market made by its export 
subsidies as well as reducing import duties on foreign produce.
51
  The EU has its own agenda for 
eliminating EU agriculture subsidies by 2013.  Reforms in the CAP began a decade prior to 
Doha.  The objective of the CAP reform is to increase the price competitiveness of agriculture 
exports and food products.
52
  The reform process reduces or eliminates the need for export 
refunds, which are WTO-constrained.
53
  However, the reform is believed to have a negative 
impact on developing countries, mainly African nations, which disrupt markets.
54
   
Modification of the CAP requires a unanimous vote by each of the member states 
represented by the Council of Ministers.
55
  Any international agriculture requirement that alters 
the terms of CAP will face difficulty in obtaining a unanimous vote.  It is no coincidence that the 
EU has had difficulty offering strong concessions during Doha negotiations.  This particular 
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Level II institution appears to decrease win-set sizes for the G-33.
56
 
The final determinant of win-set size is the strategy of level I negotiators.  All negotiators 
have an unequivocal interest in maximizing the win-set of the other side.
57
  Larger win-sets 
render concluding an agreement more likely.  However, the larger a level I win-set is, the weaker 
the level I negotiator’s bargaining position.
58
   
According to Putnam, an experienced negotiator should be able to maximize the cost-
effectiveness of the concessions that he must make to ensure international cooperation.
59
  In turn, 
the negotiator must maximize his own needs by targeting his initiatives in accordance with the 
Level II internationally and domestically.
60
  Level I negotiators will actively work together to get 
the final deal ratified.  Each Level I negotiator operates in the common interest of ratification and 
each will often attempt to reinforce the other’s standing with their respective constituents.  
Negotiators must assess the length each side will go to expand win-sets that encourage 
ratification, or in other words encourage concessions.  Methods such as side-payments are useful 
in persuading constituents to offer concessions.  Side-payments are a familiar tactic in theory as 
well as in practical politics meant to influence targeted parties into offering concessions.
61
 An 
across-the board trade concession is less effective than a concession that tips the balance with a 
swing voter.  Concessions on a specific product of interest to a congressman in support of 
agribusiness, for instance, would be an even less effective concession, as it would not alter the 
two-level balance that leads to an agreement. 
Achieving maximum win-sets requires some politically difficult moves on the part of 
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each player.  Without such difficult plays, an agreement cannot be reached.  Once the chief 
negotiators are identified for each of the five parties, I will identify all the possibilities available, 
if any, to achieving win-set that would lead to maximum gains.   
 
Possibilities within Win-sets 
Under the concept of linkage, a member of the level II will not change their preferences 
and ratify an agreement outside of their interests. Instead, an international agreement creates a 
new policy option that domestic constituents were not able to ratify through domestic control 
only.
62
  A negotiator will use the international pressures to pursue policies and/or reforms that 
would not be possible in only the domestic form.  Putnam defines synergistic linkages as the type 
of issue linkage at the international level that alters the feasible outcomes at the domestic level.  
Policy shifts might occur when international pressures, or international groups and members, 
combine with domestic pressures. 
According to Putnam, collaboration on the multilateral agriculture agenda has generated 
domestic conflict in which government bureaucracies and private interest groups assume 
prominent roles.
63
  The current agenda is unable to satisfy the domestic economic interests.  
Establishment of an international agreement requires concessions that will satisfy chief 
negotiators’ domestic constituencies. According to Putnam, a more adequate account of the 
domestic determinants of foreign policy and international relations must stress politics. Domestic 
politics comprise the combination of parties, social classes, economic and non-economic interest 
groups, legislators, and even public opinion and elections, not simply executive and institutional 
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  As Putnam notes, the groups with power will influence the Level II win-set to 
alter the outcomes in favor of their interests, thus affecting any change of ratification. 
 
Bargaining 
Bargaining refers to the manner in which an agreement is negotiated.  A negotiator’s 
bargaining abilities can vary quite a bit between level I and level II.  Certain factors can alter 
bargaining power or bargaining strategies of negotiators.  Any tentative agreement must be 
approved by each negotiator’s respective parties.   Chief negotiators may be the party leaders of 
multimember coalitions, heads of government representing nations, or finance ministers.  The 




Putnam’s theory recognizes that domestic interest groups are able to exert substantial 
influence on level II win-sets.  Political interest coalitions can alter outcomes in favor of their 
own interests and ultimately affect ratification.
65
  Level I negotiators need the level II voters 
support, and therefore recognize the importance of appealing to domestic interest groups. 
U.S. agribusinesses have a very low cost of no-agreement causing their win-sets to be too 
small to negotiate on agreeable terms and a chance of a high cost agreement. According to the 
two-level game theory, the Level I negotiator in this scenario would not be able to reach an 
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agreement with the Level II negotiators in the G-33 because of their inability to be flexible. 
Agribusiness has had very influential lobbying power in the past. The policies of the U.S. and the 
EU will often reflect the interests of influential lobby groups.  Lobbying by U.S cotton interest 
organizations have profoundly impacted the exporting agenda of U.S. cotton and limited the 
chief negotiators’ position to offer concessions to the C-4.  In addition, U.S. and EU exporters 
continue to pursue the initial three Singapore Issues despite the pushback from the G-90. 
The European Union must appeal to the agriculture groups and farmers that are supported 
within the Common Agriculture Policy.  Many of these groups are part of or support large 
agribusiness corporations that have a strong influence on domestic-level opinions and decision-
making.  As we have seen, the principles of the CAP have conflicted with the proposed 
principles of the Doha agreement and ultimately could compromise ratification on the domestic 
level.  Domestic constituents are more likely to accept international agriculture principles that do 
not conflict with the function of CAP. 
 
Side Payments 
Side payments are evoked as a secondary step in a negotiation as an attempt towards 
furthering agreement. Side payments are generally used as a last attempt in creating concessions 
when all other options have been tried. A side payment can reshape win-sets so that existing 
actors can be presented with incentives to act differently than they have in negotiations thus far.
66
  
According to Andrew Moravcsik, any attempt to reshape win-sets by 
manipulating domestic actors will be most effective when their interests are uncertain or weak, 
interests are balanced, and their power is marginal.   
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Side-payments can appear as financial compensation or as concessions on other issues.  
Putnam’s two-level game approach emphasizes that the value of the side-payment is calculated 
in terms of its marginal contribution to the likelihood of ratification, rather than in terms of its 
overall value to the recipient nation.  The real value is not total national costs and benefits, but 
their influence relative to existing domestic coalitions. 
Bargaining power is often unequal between chief negotiators.  If it appears that there are 
minimum or no win-sets available between the Cotton-4 and the U.S, the G-33 and the U.S. and 
the EU, or the G-90 and the U.S. and the EU, side payments may become a more effective 




In addition to the determinants of win-set size, Putnam’s theory accounts for influence 
from organizational processes in the formation of win-sets.  In the past, the President of the 
United States has enabled fast-track mechanisms for trade agreements that can accelerate the 
process of ratification.  Fast-tracking eliminates some otherwise necessary and tedious steps in 
the ratification process under Congress. 
67
  A fast-track system will be implemented when an 
administration seeks to gain approval for an agreement.  A fast-track vote can be an opportunity 
for interest groups to demonstrate their influence over an agreement.  In contrast, it can also be 
perceived as a threat.  For these reasons, gaining the approval of interest groups could encourage 
or prevent a fast track vote.
68
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In 2003, the Bush administration attempted to use its trade promotion authority, or TPA, 
to allow the Doha agreements to be approved more quickly.  At this time, the original deadline to 
end Doha talks was 2005.  The TPA was to expire in June 2007. Under this fast-track authority, 
the executive branch would commit to extensive consultations with Congress and all other 
relevant U.S. constituencies during trade negotiations.
 69
   In exchange, congress would agree to 
procedures that allow a bill to move more quickly through the ratification process.  In other 
words, any potentially deal-killing amendments would be banned and timely votes would be 
mandated.
70
  The TPA was to be put in place during the Cancun talks.  The unexpected 
emergence of the coalitions caused the TPA to be forgotten and unused.   
 If the Bush administration was able to gain the consent of Congress to implement a fast-
track before Cancun, there is no reason that the Obama administration should not be able to do 
the same now.  Recognizing the significance of relative gains, the only way that the United 
States and Congress will promote a fast-track mechanism is if win-sets are created that offer 
some form of concession in exchange for fast-tracking the agreement.  Fast tracking is a 
plausible option for achieving ratification.  Similar fast-track authority was granted under the 
Clinton administration regarding the ratification of the NAFTA agreement.
71
  
In Chapter 3, I proceed by introducing the history and main principles of the agreement.  
The coalitions and the U.S. and EU disagree on the main principles of Doha.  In the forthcoming 
chapters, I will identify all members of each of the Cotton-4, G-33 and G-90 coalitions as well.  
The intent in examining the agreement and establish each party’s position is to begin to consider 
the possibilities that identifying win-sets could lead to an agreement.   











Chapter 3:  Background on Doha talks on Agriculture 
Significant attempts at negotiation by the three developing country coalitions were made 
in Hong Kong in 2005 and Geneva in 2009.  Just as in to the Cancun Ministerial of 2003, 
negotiations collapsed at Geneva in 2009.  The 2012 meeting in Geneva was the last formal 
ministerial meeting for The Doha Declaration Agenda (DDA).    
 
History 
For nearly fifty years leading to the establishment of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), the international trading system came under the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, or the GATT.
72
 The GATT was the ruling agreement for trade within the UN system from 
1948 to 1994.  It provided the rules for much of world trade during eight rounds of negotiations.  
Included were the preliminary market access commitments for the purpose of settling tariff 
quotas.  However, the GATT was provisional.  Though it was in place for the first forty-seven 
years, ultimately a permanent agreement and organization were required.
73
 
The WTO was realized during the final GATT round, the Uruguay Round, in 1994.  It 
was officially established at Marrakesh, Morocco in 1995.
74
  The Uruguay Round dealt with 
fifteen subjects, one of which was agriculture. At this time, an agreement was created for 
agriculture trade.  The Uruguay Round agreement included the original commitments on market 
access, domestic support and export competition, and export subsidies. It took the form of what 
is now the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA.) 
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The main goal of the AoA was to increase fairness in agriculture and reduce distortion. 
Commitments were agreed on regarding market access, domestic support and export subsidies 
for all members.  Deadlines for reaching these commitments were negotiated as well. The AoA 
commitments were imposed to minimize the distortion in competitiveness and world commodity 
prices. Commitments varied for each member nation and thus had disparate effects.  From 1996 
to 2001, reductions in domestic and export subsidies were to be implemented.  These were 
launched in 2000, as obligated by the agreement.  
In practice, the agreement altered very little.
75
  The agreement allowed countries to 
continue to subsidize exports and use import quotas that had negative effects on developing 
countries.  The agreement had allowed developing nations, which collectively make up the 
majority of WTO members, to reduce trade barriers to a lesser extent than developed countries.  
Over the decade following the Uruguay Round, subsidies have increased trade distortion in 
agricultural trade.
76
  These distortions have impacted developing nations more severely than 
developed countries.  Developed nations did not incur major disadvantages from the AoA.  It 
was the developing nations that were burdened by the negative impacts of the GATT 
negotiations on agriculture and believed their needs were not represented in the treaty. 
 
Negotiation Procedures 
In the negotiations, members are categorized as either developed or developing.  This is 
based on each country’s relative economic status.  The categories are a reflection of their global 
economic standing.  Over two-thirds of developing countries are given special treatment, at times 
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rendering their obligations less severe than the developed countries.   Market access is one of the 
principles of disagreements for the majority of developed and developing countries.    
The Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) facilitates all WTO negotiation talks.  
Subsidiaries of the Trade Negotiations Committee include special sessions, or specially created 
negotiating groups.
77
 With the emergence of new developing country coalitions at Cancun, the 
General Council decided that all issues specific to negotiating groups would be handled within 
the TNC.  DDA negotiation talks also take place in the special sessions, including in the 
Committee on Agriculture.
78
 Meetings can be formal or informal and many drafts can and have 
been submitted before approaching ministerial meetings. Each coalition invested great effort into 
negotiations and organized together in preparation sessions and briefing sessions leading up to 
and during Ministerial Meetings. 
There have been many meetings, both formal and informal, since the failed Cancun 
Ministerial.  Several informal negotiations, such as mini-meetings, have also taken place. The 
Cancun Ministerial was the fifth meeting and the first to follow Doha in 2001.  The July 2004 
Package, otherwise known as the Derbez Draft, was put together after the collapse at Cancun.
79
  
Mexican Foreign Minister Luis Derbez put together a draft that encompassed the interests of the 
coalitions including changes in market access.
80
  The plan was the first attempt to recover the 
Doha agenda and continue moving towards ratification.  Though it addressed the concerns posed 
by developing coalitions, it was criticized by developing nations as not being substantial enough.  
Once again, the DDA made little progress towards ratification and thus talks carried into the next 
ministerial conference.   
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The sixth ministerial took place in Hong Kong, China from December 13th to 18th in 
2005.
81
 Hong Kong was just a few weeks shy of the original deadline members had committed to 
in the Doha agreement.   By the time January 1st 2005 came, minimal progress had been made 
towards eliminating subsidies, and the original deadline was missed.
82
 
Between 2006 and 2007, members brought forward draft modalities meant to set 
schedules for commitments on agriculture.  Intensive negotiations continued concerning the three 
pillars and their disciplines over the next two years but produced little change.  Another draft 
was presented the following year:  the July 2008 Package.  The special safeguard mechanism 
was highly supported by developing country members and highly contested by the developed 
country members. Ultimately, SSM was a major deterrent in finalizing a mutually supported 
draft at the Geneva Ministerial.
83
 
The seventh session of the WTO Ministerial Conference took place from November 30th 
to December 2
nd
, 2009 in Geneva, Switzerland.
84
  This conference ended in a stalemate.  The 
disparate views on agriculture led to collapse once again.  A considerable degree of effort and 
time has been dedicated to concluding the Doha agreement.  A second collapse suggests that the 
agendas among level I and level II negotiators are going to require significant adjustment if the 
two sides are able to reach an agreement after more than a decade.  The eighth round occurred in 
Geneva in 2011. Issues continued to circle around market access, SM, and developing country 
representation.
 85
   It seems many countries have lost the political will to complete Doha at this 
point.   
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As noted earlier, the most recent ministerial was the ninth Ministerial conference of 
December 2012.  Though many member nations, including the United States, showed vigor in 
seeing Doha through until a decision is reached, a final decision was once again extended. 
At ministerial conferences, the central decision-makers can affect the developments of 
win-sets and possible concessions. The chief negotiators play the most dynamic role in two-level 
negotiations.  Assessment of the central decision-makers within the three coalition groups and 
the opposing parties and their bargaining positions will be necessary to support the hypothesis. 
 
Developing Country Coalitions   
 
Coalitions are defined as groups of two or more members that agree to combine their 
resources in pursuit of a collective purpose.
86
 The objective of such groupings in the multilateral 
trading system is to achieve a shared advantage against a common opponent or to attain a 
mutually beneficial goal.  There are two main types of coalitions in negotiations:  issue-based 
and bloc-type.
87
  Issue-based coalitions form based on ideational or identity-related factors.  This 
type of coalition handles specific threats and typically dissolves once the issue is addressed.
88
  
Bloc-type coalitions are known to have high-demands in negotiations and operate across multiple 
issues.
89
  The main characteristic of a bloc-type coalition is the use of a collective strategy to 
promote demands for negotiations.  Historically, they have been typical of developing 
countries.
90
    
The Cotton 4, the G-33, and the G-90 implement concepts from both issue-based and 
bloc-type coalitions.  At their inception, the countries that comprised the Cotton 4, the G33, and 
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the G-90 were all developing nations.  Since then, countries such as China, India and Turkey 
have joined and these are no longer considered developing.
91
  The presence and size of the 
coalitions have increased and they have continued to be a force throughout DDA negotiations.  
All the members of the three developing country coalitions are listed below in Table 2.  
Coalition members often overlap, as evident in the diagram.  The larger the coalition is, the 
greater the possibility that members will belong to multiple coalitions.  Coalitions have often 





Cotton-4 Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali,  
G-33 Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, China, Congo, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, 
Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Korea, Mauritius, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, 
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, St Kitts and Nevis, St 
Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Tanzania, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe (now 46 
members) 
G-90 Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Congo, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, 
Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and 
Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, 
Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Vanuatu, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
 + African Group + LDCs (now 67members,  60 from ACP, 41 from the African 
Group with overlapping members, and 33 from LDC with overlapping members.) 
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Frustrations among developing countries reached a breaking point on August 13, 2003 in 
response to a draft proposed by the United States and European Union.  At the request of WTO 
members during the Mini-Ministerial meeting held in Montreal, the two members began to put 
together a framework for the agriculture negotiations.  This was an attempt to facilitate the 
negotiation process in preparation for the upcoming Ministerial Conference.
93
  Developing 
countries across the board reacted. In response, the developing nations joined to increase 
strategic bargaining and the three developing coalitions were formed. 
The coalitions have improved the voice of developing countries within the DDA.  
However, it can be said that the coalitions’ demands have contributed to the impeded completion 
of an agreement.  A concluded agreement ultimately serves the coalitions’ needs better than no 
agreement.  Adjustments need to be made to all three coalitions’ proposals that will allow a final 
agreement to be reached.  The positions of each coalition relate to the terms of the Agreement on 
Agriculture itself.  A brief summary of the agreement must be given before any assessment of 
the three coalitions’ and U.S. and E.U. positions can be assessed. 
 
The Agreement 
Under the original Agreement on Agriculture, WTO members agreed to establish 
modalities and principles regarding agriculture.  These set the parameters for the Doha round.  
Broadly, the objective is to reduce distortions in agricultural trade caused by high tariffs and 
other barriers, export subsidies, and forms of domestic support.
94
  The main issues in 
negotiations are how to implement the necessary changes; how to reduce distortions, how to cut 
tariffs, and how to handle the elimination of subsidies.  The framework is based on three pillars:  
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Market Access, Domestic Support and Export Competition.
95
 The majority of the issues stalling 
the agreement stem from the specifics of the three disciplines.  The Market Access pillar aims to 
reduce obstructive tariffs. For developing nations, market access measures can protect against 
extreme market conditions including flooding of imports.  Also facing debate is the “single-
undertaking” approach concerning a final negotiation package.  
The Special or Strategic Products and Special Safeguard Mechanism are applied under 
the market access pillar of the agreement as well. Strategic products referred to in the original 
modalities text of February 2003 called the Harbison Draft were later termed special products.  
In the July 2004 draft, Article 6 of the AoA deemed special products as a means for developing 
countries to self-designate a limited or “appropriate amount” of tariff lines guided by indicators 
based on the criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural development.   
Within the agreement are three color-coded boxes used to categorize agriculture 
subsidies. Subsidies are considered domestic support and are arranged under the green box, blue 
box, and auburn box according to the level of impact each has had on world trade.  The boxes are 
meant to correct and prevent any potential distortions to international trading.
96
  The idea behind 
color coding the boxes was to mimic the message of a traffic light; green being safe to continue 
on, blue to slow down, and auburn to stop.  Green box subsidies were the top box and were 
colored as such because they have been permitted to remain in use.  All subsidies categorized 
within the amber box have reportedly had damaging effects on global market prices and should 
be stalled or reduced.  The blue box is similar to the amber box, but with conditions to reduce 
distortion. Certain exemptions exist for subsidies belonging to developing countries and are 
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labeled the S&D box within the blue box.  Further distinctions between the three boxes are listed 
below in Table 1.   
 
Table 1 
The Amber Box  Defined in Article 6 of the 
Agriculture Agreement, which 
states, 
“ investment subsidies which are 
generally available to agriculture 
in developing country Members 
and agricultural input subsidies 
generally available to low-income 
or resource-poor producers in 
developing country Members 





 Includes domestic subsidies 
related to production quantities 
 Includes reduction 
commitments: 5% of 
agricultural production for 
developed countries, 10% for 
developing countries allowed. 
 Negotiations: 
 
 How much further these 
subsidies should be reduced, 
 Whether limits should be set for 
specific products rather than 
continuing with current method 
of single aggregate limits 
 
The Blue Box 
 
 Defined in Paragraph 5 of 
Article 6 of the Agriculture 
Agreement, which states,  
“Direct payments under 
production-
limiting programs shall not be 
subject to the commitment to 
reduce domestic support if such 
payments are made on 85 per 
cent or less of the base level of 
production or livestock 








  Developing countries seek to 
move all blue box subsidies to 
the amber box 
 Developed nations seek to 
maintain the current blue box  
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 No set rules on the size of cuts 
that should be made 
The Green Box  Defined in Annex 2 of the 
Agriculture Agreement  
“Domestic support 
measures…shall meet the 
fundamental requirement that 
they have no, or at most 
minimal, trade-distorting effects 
or effects on production.”
99
 
 Only contains non-distorting 
subsidies 
 Includes direct payments to 
producers, and government 
financial support for income 
insurance and income safety-net 
programs. 
 No reductions or caps required 
 Negotiations: 
 
 EU and U.S. plan to shift most 
subsidies to green box. 
 Developing nations are 
suspicious of "box-shifting" by 
the major subsidizing countries.  
Subsidies could be claimed as 
green-box so that they do not 
seem to be distorting. 
 
 
WTO, Agriculture Negations:  Background Fact Sheet< www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agboxes_e.htm> 
 
Export subsidies encourage artificial competition by increasing the share of the exporter 
in the world market at the cost of others.
100
  This negatively affects world market prices causing 
instability.  Under the original agreement, developed countries agreed to cut the value of export 
subsidies by thirty-six percent and twenty-four percent over ten years for developing 
countries.
101
  Developed countries also agreed to reduce the quantities of subsidized exports by 
twenty-one percent and fourteen percent for developing countries.
102
   Not all countries agree to 
this formula.  Many who have committed to them still have not met their obligations.  The 
obstacle for export subsidies is agreeing on how the phase-out or elimination process should be 
applied.   
 The positions on agriculture are so divided because the effects of change would have very 
different outcomes for the two sides.  Changes could mean less profit for developed nations.  
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Accepting an agreement under the terms requested by developing nations may contradict current 
domestic legislation or interest groups.   Any agreement must determine how to achieve Doha’s 
development goals while maintaining developed nations’ domestic level approval.
103
  
Negotiators continue to disagree over the objectives of the agreement and how to implement 
them. The developing nations’ demands prove difficult to sell, especially in terms of gains. 
The combination of rigid formulas and nonnegotiable flexibilities eradicates concrete 
gains in market access needed to encourage domestic support.  The formulas established for 
correcting trade imbalances target the highest tariffs and require that the largest tariffs incur the 
greatest reductions.  These are applied to developed nations but at a lesser extent than developing 
nations.  Developing countries have significant flexibilities within the current agreement in the 
form of exclusions from formula cuts.   
Many of the developing country coalitions argue for the elimination of agriculture 
subsidies.
104
 Eliminating developed nations’ subsidies would result in a monetary loss and is 
against the interest of the U.S. and the E.U.   Even if the parties could reach an agreement on 
reducing or eliminating subsidies, the parties have had a difficult time creating a mutually 
favorable formula for “phasing out” the reductions.
105
   The phase out process would determine 
the rate at which subsidies are reduced and the timeframe allotted for achieving final reduction 
rates.  Developing coalitions have pushed for subsidy reduction; the Cotton-4 has pioneered the 
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Negotiations on the cotton proposal began during the Cancun Ministerial Conference of 
2003.  The first proposal, Sectoral Initiative on Cotton, was later titled “Poverty Reduction:  
Sectoral Initiative in Favor of Cotton” within the 2004 agreement.
106
 The initiative was intended 
to assist in bargaining for changes with the United States cotton trade policy and subsidies.  
Subsidies have been profitable for both the United States’ and the European Union’s economies.   
However, these have been detrimental to West Africa. 
In addition to subsidy issues, members’ views differed as to whether cotton issues should 
be handled as an additional category within the agreement or come under the three pillars of the 
original agreement. They also differed over the question of reimbursement for losses. 
 
The Cotton 4 
In 2001, as a consequence of U.S. and E.U. cotton subsidies, Burkina Faso lost one 
percent of its GDP and twelve percent of its export incomes. Mali lost slightly fewer than two 
percent and eight percent, and Benin slightly over one percent and nine percent.
107
  The cotton 
initiative proposed that cotton-producing West African nations receive compensation for the 
negative impact subsidies have caused.  Currently, the WTO does not allot any development 
funding or compensation other than for training officials.
108
 
The C-4 delivered revisions to the first proposal during the Hong Kong Conference.  The 
chief negotiators were the U.S. delegation and members of the C-4.  No substantial progress was 
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made on domestic support in the Hong Kong text.   The C-4 viewed the commitments made in 
terms of increasing market access for cotton products as stagnant. 
An informal meeting took place in November 2011 among those concerned with the 
cotton outcome.  The C-4 felt strongly that a ‘standstill principle’ should apply to these subsidies 
while a negotiated solution is being reached.109   The “standstill principle” would require all 




A preliminary framework proposal was submitted by the U.S. and E.U. which caused 
negative reactions in developing nations, including the members of the G-33.  The developing 
nations reacted by coming together on issues of common interest, including cotton. 
 
The G-90 
The G-90’s role in the cotton dispute has been simply to support developing nations.  All 
of the Cotton 4 nations are also members of the G-90.    
 
The U.S. 
The United States has taken a strong stance against The Cotton Initiative.  Not only does 
the U.S. disagree with the requested changes in domestic support, it feels no obligation to fulfill 
the unprecedented request for the C-4 nations to be reimbursed for their losses. 
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The U.S. is one of the largest cotton producing countries with a considerable
110
 degree of 
the market share.  In fact, the U.S. holds close to forty percent of the world market.
111
  Africa’s 
cotton exports generate approximately fifteen percent of the market share.  
It is important to mention the case of Brazil vs. The United States concerning cotton that 
was ruled under the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) in favor of Brazil.  Brazil became 
concerned that U.S. export subsidies were hindering the Brazilian cotton sector.  After eight 
years of deliberation within the DSM, the panel found that the U.S. cotton subsidies had, in fact, 
been trade-distorting and harmful and ruled that the United States must correct the loopholes 
found within their cotton subsidies.
112
 Though the case has no direct relation to the C-4, it has 
constrained the United States’ bargaining position within the Cotton Initiative.  An Oxfam report 
noted that the ruling rendered the U.S. less willing to budge in negotiations with the C-4.
113
  The 
U.S. came out of the dispute settlement ruling with expectations for the C-4 as well, hoping that 
the coalition might be able to make stronger concessions in light of the Brazil case rulings.  
 
The EU 
The European Union has traditionally been importers of cotton.   Farming subsidies have 
been essential to supporting the EU CAP and producing valuable exports.
114
   Eliminating 
subsidies would result in economic losses for the EU and its member countries.  The European 
Union’s position in the cotton negotiations is primarily as a supporter of the United States’ 
agenda to maintain cotton subsidies in West Africa. 
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The Cotton-4 directs its demands towards the EU’s cotton subsidies as well as the United 
States.  However, the C-4 agenda has been primarily at-odds with the U.S.  Therefore, the EU 
has less involvement in the Cotton Initiative than the U.S.   Still, the EU is significant in the 
trajectory of the negotiations between the U.S. and West African cotton exporters.   
The Brazil vs. United States ruling required the EU to make changes to cotton subsidies 
as well, though to a lesser extent. 
 
SP and SSM Issues 
 
Through the bargaining efforts of the G-33, both SP and SSM have become part of the 
agreement.
115
  Though progress has been made, the level of success delivered only fractions of 
what the coalition desired.  The parties differ over the concept of special and differential 
treatment (S&D) and to what degree S&D can be applied. The G-33 (and in some forms, the C-
4) propose alterations based on S&D.   
By 2008, disagreements over the dynamics of the SSM for developing countries caused 
negotiations at the July Ministerial meeting in Geneva to end in deadlock.  Developed nations 
found the proposed mechanisms of SSM difficult to approve the shared sentiment that under 
these terms a country could self-designate as they please and appoint special products with no 
limitations.  Developed nations feared that this approach would give unlimited control to 
developing countries to call any product a special product and, in turn, limit their ability to profit 
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 The interests of the Cotton-4 share some similarities with the G-33.  The Cotton-4 seeks 
the same special and differential treatment that SP & SSM would offer.  The principle difference 
is that the Cotton-4 is interested in attaining this treatment solely for the cotton crops produced 




The G-33 proposed that Special Safeguards be self-designated and be used at any given 
time as the developing nations saw fit to protect rural farmers and domestic markets.  This was a 
bold proposition geared toward domestic agendas rather than a multilateral framework; this 
proposition would likely be incapable of satisfying domestic-level demands for the United 
States.  In addition, this would produce minimum win-sets for one side and maximum win-sets 
for another.  Other WTO coalitions opposed this idea as well, stating that developing nations 
could abuse this system to discriminate against legitimate foreign trade entering their markets.  
For the G-33, a SP and SSM mechanism must be implemented within the guidelines of 
self-designation.  Many of these nations attempt to protect crops that their nation’s GDP depends 
on, such as rice in the Philippines.  The group maintains that the centrality of development in 
Doha addresses issues of food security, livelihood or job security, and rural development.
116
  The 
members of G-33 find it critical that there be simple pre-emptive safeguards to protect their 
exports.  Negotiators have urged the U.S. and EU to recognize the substantial nature of 
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The G-33 is adamant that the mechanisms meant to strengthen protections for SP and 
SSM still fall short. The coalition’s original proposal was aimed at providing flexibility for 
countries to enhance domestic food production and adopt measures to protect the livelihoods of 




The G-90 members promote the G-33 approach for special and differential treatment in 
addition to their stance on the single-undertaking and the Singapore Issues.  However, it does not 
include SP & SSM within its own demands. 
 
The U.S. 
The U.S. saw the proposed mechanisms of SSM difficult to approve.  The G-33 had 
proposed that Special Safeguards be self-designated and be used at any given time as the 
developing nations felt was necessary to protect their economies.
118
  The U.S. has made several 
proposals in response to SP & SSM.  The revised proposals offered by the U.S. include a ceiling 
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The EU found it difficult to approve all the demands within the SSM proposal as well. 
Since the G-33 proposed it be granted special treatment, the EU has been in strong opposition to 
the SP & SSM, especially the self-designation discipline. The EU has opposed the special and 
differential treatment mandates, specifically within the SSM and SP proposal as-is, with the 
concern that it would impede their market access.
120
  The EU has protested that an SP and SSM 
instrument that did so would be burdensome to them (and the U.S.) 
 
Single-Undertaking & Singapore Issues 
A single-undertaking decision is a principle that guides the work of the Doha Declaration 
Agenda (DDA.)  According to the WTO, this means that every item of the negotiation is part of a 
whole and indivisible package and cannot be agreed separately.
121
 There is a commonly used 
phrase for this approach:  “Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.”
122
 It requires that every 
member sign on to binding disciplines with no flexibility.  Not all WTO agreements adhere to 
this approach.  For an agreement with disparate complexities being addressed, a single-
undertaking approach may exacerbate any grievances surrounding a final agreement.
123
 It is 
possible that an alternative policy for DDA may be more suitable.  Some developing-country 
members have adopted this position via the formation of coalitions. 
The four components of the Singapore Issues are investment, competition policy, 
government procurement and trade facilitation.  The G-90 demands, with great resistance, that 
the Singapore Issues be removed from the Doha agreement.   
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The Cotton 4 
Though the four members of the C-4 are involved in single-undertaking and Singapore 
Issue negotiations through the G-90, the cotton coalition and its interests are unconnected.  The 
group simply offers its support as a developing country coalition and as members. 
 
The G-33 
In addition to offering support for one another, the G-33 and G-90’s interests often 
overlap (as do their members.)  The dynamic between these two coalitions has, at times, 
strengthened the voice of developing nations.  On the other hand, it has caused a convolution of 






The G-90 has two principal interests:   removing the Singapore Issues from the Doha 
agreement and changing the single-undertaking ruling.  The G-90 sees the single-undertaking as 
a roadblock for Doha because it would require them to concede to terms of free trade for which 
their markets are not yet prepared. 
125
 The G-90 feels it should be permitted to open markets at 
its own pace rather than have a uniform policy that works for developed countries forced onto 
developing markets more inclined to protectionism.  The developing countries’ perception of 
global trade is not compatible with the developed nations’ perception.    
Under the Singapore Issues “Trade and Competition” tariffs were applied to all countries.  
Not only are these tariff allocations dated (first established in 1996,) the majority of G-90 
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African member-nations pay some of the highest tariffs when exporting.  The G-90 is interested 




The G-90's position has continuously been met with stiff resistance from the U.S.  The 
U.S. has demanded that developing countries and LDCs make severe tariff cuts on their products 
to increase market liberalization.  
 
The EU 
The EU is the primary export destination for many of these countries.  At the Hong Kong 
Ministerial, the EU proposed an agreement ofinvolving a package of development measures 
concerning the G-90.   Their attempt at meeting the interests of the G-90 was met with 
disappointment.  The EU has not offered the G-90 the level of market access it has demanded.
126
 
The EU has put pressure on the G-90 to change their position on market access.  In 
addition, the group is defensive about any agenda that alters the provisions of the CAP. Many of 
the member countries of the G-90 are vulnerable to U.S. and EU pressures since most have some 
kind of preferential trading arrangement with the two powers.
127
 The EU remains much more 
willing to negotiate bilaterally with G-90 about the Singapore Issues.  As far as the single-
undertaking is concerned, the EU is in a similar position as the U.S.   
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The positions of the C-4, G-33, G-90, the United States and the European Union revealed 
the areas of interests for each.  In Chapter 5, I will review the hindrances of the win-sets as they 
have been in the past and as they currently exist now.   Once the win-sets are identified, I will 
use the previously-identified areas of interest to determine what common goals, if any, exist that 
could cause an alignment in interests and demands thus creating larger win-sets.  Identifying the 
win-sets in Doha negotiations in cotton, market access, the single-undertaking and Singapore 
issues could make further concessions available that render larger win-sets and greater likelihood 
of finalizing an agreement.   
In Chapter 4, I will introduce the win-sets that exist between the C-4, G-33 and G-90 
coalitions, the United States, and the European Union.  I will identify possible scenarios for each 
coalition vs. U.S. and EU that alter interests that may cause an overlap in the bargaining parties’ 
win-sets.  Win-sets are instrumental in identifying any common interests that when aligned, 
could alter the likelihood of achieving an agreement and ultimately lead to valuable concessions. 






















Chapter 4 – Identifying and Adjusting Win-sets in Doha 
 
As defined in Chapter 2, a win-set is the area in which the interests or concerns of 
negotiating parties intersect.  Negotiating the areas within a win-set can permit negotiators to 
reach an agreement.   In two- level games, the size of the win- set is important because the 
relative size of the respective Level II win- sets will affect the distribution of the joint gains from 
the international bargaining.  Win-sets are either large or small.  The larger the win-set is, the 
more the interests of the negotiators intersect, making agreement more possible.  In contrast, 
negotiators with smaller win-sets share fewer common interests and agreement is therefore less 
probable.   
As they currently stand, the win-sets in Doha do not allow shared interests necessary to 
reach an agreement.  The interests of each party involved in the issues of cotton, market access, 
the single-undertaking and The Singapore Issues were explained in the previous chapter.  
Chapter 4 examines the hindrances to the success of the Doha negotiations.  In addition, this 
chapter identifies the possibilities under win-sets that may enable the parties to come to an 
agreement, ultimately allowing the negotiations to move forward. 
With respect to market access, the U.S. will need to make concessions towards cotton.  
This has been difficult to do since its national interest is so invested in creating strong cotton 
exports.  The first determinant of win-set size depends on the distribution of power, preferences 
and coalitions among level II constituents.  In U.S. domestic politics, chief negotiators have 
pursued expanded market access endeavors and a more liberalized trade agenda.  Liberalization 




companies and interest groups have ties to congress.
128
  The same has appeared to be true for the 
European Union.   
The second of the three determinants of win-set size is the Level II political institutions.  
To recall Putnam, the stronger the state is in terms of autonomy from domestic pressure, the 
weaker its relevant bargaining position internationally.
129
 Level I negotiators will find bargaining 
difficult when preferences of level I constituents are mixed.
130
  When domestic constituents are 
firmly committed to a single policy, it is less likely that an international agreement will be met.  
Another factor within a political institution affecting win-set size is the participation rate in the 
ratification process, which includes the influence of political interest groups.
131
 
The American cotton organizations are extremely organized in their mission to increase 
exports of U.S. cotton.
132
  Some of the prominent pro-cotton organizations in the U.S. are U.S. 
Cotton, the National Cotton Council of America (also known as Cotton USA), and The Cotton 
Council International.  In addition to being highly profitable, these companies maintain a 
dominant presence in domestic negotiations.  
133
  The influence of pro-cotton groups severely 
limits the bargaining power as well as the available win-set of the chief negotiator.  The U.S. and 
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The Cotton-4 maintain a “standstill” position on their demands for reimbursement by the 
U.S., the EU, and other major powers in addition to the application of special and differential 
treatment for cotton products in the four West African nations. As it is, agreement cannot be 
reached since the U.S. and EU claim that domestic constituents will not approve the inclusion of 
special and differential treatment for cotton. The negotiators for the C-4 act together 
internationally and will require strong incentives from other international negotiators to shift 
position on their demands. This arrangement leaves little room for agreement and appears to be a 
minimum win-set in the two-level game.  
The U.S. is home to an excess of companies in the cotton industry. Any agenda that 
would decrease the competitiveness of American cotton has been strongly opposed by private 
sector cotton companies. As Putnam has noted, domestic constituents will often be influenced by 
political interest groups, particularly those interest groups with a considerable amount of 
bargaining power. It would be unwise and unlikely for any domestic constituents to approve an 
agenda that negatively affect their own interests. 
During a December 2011 meeting in Geneva, the United States Trade Representative Ron 
Kirk spoke with representatives of the Cotton 4, including Ms. Madina Sephou, Minister of 
Industry, Commerce, and Small and Medium Enterprises for Benin and Mr. Mahamat Allahou 
Taher, Minister of Commerce and Industry for Chad.
134
  The Obama administration tabled a U.S. 
proposal for cotton that would help boost trade for African cotton-producing countries.  The 
proposal included expansion of duty-free and quota-free treatment for upland cotton grown in 
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Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali.
135
  Additionally, it incorporated a multi-year renewal of 
the West Africa Cotton Improvement Program (WACIP), a successful technical assistance 
program for West African cotton producing countries.  U.S. trade preference programs such as 
the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) also played to the interests of the C-4.
136
 
Chadian Minister Allahou Taher and USTR Kirk have made great progress with this 
proposal including the WACIP and AGOA.  According to Minister Taher, once implemented, 
the 2011 cotton initiative will have a very important impact on African farmers.  The initiative is 
a step toward achieving sizeable win-sets and satisfying the relevant interests at the domestic 
level and international level.  The proposal put forward by the Obama administration is an 
example of the role played by political institutions in determining win-set size.  Under another 
administration, the proposal might not have been possible.  Thus, the importance of political 
leadership in multilateral agreements is evident.  
Prosper Vokouma, the current ambassador of Burkina Faso to the WTO, reported that the 
countries were receptive to the U.S. offer but ultimately needed to see changes to the U.S. cotton 
program in the next U.S. Farm Bill set to be enacted in 2013.
137
  While this arrangement renders 
larger win-sets for a regional agreement between the U.S. and West African nations Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali, it does not necessarily produce the larger win-sets that are needed 
















Adjusted Win-sets for Cotton:  the Cotton-4 vs.  U.S. 
 
The achievements made in negotiations between the two parties thus far have made win-
sets more possible, but clearly do not create the win-sets necessary to reach an agreement.  There 
are two possible ways to create strong win-sets for the Cotton-4 and the United States.  The first 
recommendation addresses market access and the possibility of C-4 countries increasing U.S. 
access to non-sensitive products in an alternate market.  The second recommendation considers a 
past Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) ruling between the U.S. and Brazil, in which the 
U.S. was tried (and lost) in a case that argued for special protection for sensitive products. 
The best incentive to offer the U.S. is increased market access in exchange for 
concessions in market reform.  In a case as specific as cotton, the Cotton-4 coalition could offer 
the U.S. market access in areas other than cotton.  Doing so would certainly create plausible win-
sets as the concessions would allow for interests to coincide. Allocating the industry, or 
industries, in which market access would be increased for Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali 
will be most crucial.  The optimal choice in industry may be non-agricultural as it would not 
have the same trade-distorting effect or hold any threat to food security.  Cotton is the cash-crop 
of these four nations.  A product that yields lower profits with less centrality to the economies of 
West Africa would be optimal.  If such an industry could be agreed upon, the Cotton 4 and the 
United States would have new possibilities of a win-set which ultimately may render an 
agreement possible.  
According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, agriculture is the leading sector for 






  A 2011 CCG report for doing business in Mali identifies agriculture as a leading U.S. 
sector in high demand.
139
  Other leading commercial sectors include automobiles, mainly 
including large buses and trucks.  The demand for buses and public transportation vehicles is 
quite high in Benin, Chad, and Burkina Faso.  The Chad Ministry of Infrastructure and 
Transportation further ascertains that intercity travel in the four West African nations is 
underdeveloped and in need of an efficient transportation system with official buses to replace 
informal vans and minibuses.
140
  The United States automobile industry has struggled to produce 
gains in the past five years and could benefit greatly from a trading arrangement with West 
Africa.  An alternative agreement between the U.S. and the Cotton-4 within the automobile 
industry would allow the United States increased market access in the Cotton-4’s markets in 
exchange for approving the Cotton Initiative.  This exchange would be mutually beneficial and 
would produce absolute gains.  For these reasons, the automobile industry is the ideal non-
agriculture sector arrangement which would enable larger win-sets for Doha. 
With respect to the DSM case of Brazil, it has had little impact on the C4 coalition 
directly, but could be used to leverage further bargaining power over the U.S.  The ruling left the 
U.S legally obligated to compensate Brazil’s cotton sector until its subsidies were dealt with.  
The ruling gave Brazil the exact outcome that the C-4 has been demanding and has not received.  
The outcome has had an impact on the bargaining position of the U.S. and made them more 
stringent in offering concessions to those impacted by cotton in West Africa.  An Oxfam report 
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noted that the ruling set the tone for the U.S. negotiations with the Cotton-4.
141
  The U.S. came 
out of the dispute settlement ruling with expectations that the C-4 might be able to make 
concessions in other areas.   
 Working with Brazil, or engaging in linkage, could be an opportunity for the Cotton-4 to 
facilitate their demands on the U.S.  However, this move may not be available to the C-4 at this 
point as the ruling came into effect in 2010.  John Baffes, who has written extensive reports on 
the global cotton dispute, shares the belief that a linkage between the C-4 and Brazil could 
enhance their bargaining position against the U.S.  In a 2011 report by Baffes, he examines the 
implications of the DSM ruling in relation to the C-4. Under the April 2010 ruling, the United 
States agreed to work with Brazil to establish a fund that will provide technical assistance and 
capacity building to their cotton sector.
142
  Importantly, Baffes directs attention to a 
Memorandum of Understanding in which the U.S. agrees to provide international cooperation 
related to the same sector in certain other countries.
143
  In effect, the U.S. has recognized that 
their cotton subsidies have negatively impacted other countries in addition to Brazil and would 
require the U.S. to cooperate in reaching a mutually agreed solution to the dispute in cotton 
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The G-33 has been the pioneer in establishing Special Products and Strategic Safeguard 
Mechanism (SP and SSM.)  The United States and the European Union have been most opposed 
to these changes to market access.  After the proposal of the July 2008 package, Ambassador 
Crawford Falconer of New Zealand concluded that the implementation of SSM continues to be a 
deal-breaker issue for a Doha agreement. The G-33 coalition insists on independently selecting 
the products that are excluded from cuts rather than negotiating them.  This arrangement would 
allow developing economies to be relieved of fulfilling the commitments on formula cuts that 
were previously allocated.  This puts developed country negotiators, mainly the United States 
and the European Union, in a defensive posture and makes progress towards solidifying an 
agreement less probable.
144
 Falconer led the most recent Committee on Agriculture (COA) 
Special Session dealing with Special Products and the Strategic Safeguard Mechanism.   
The existing agreement on safeguards does not restrict Special Products.  It does not 
require that members increase tariff prices of the previous negotiating round, nor does the 
Special Safeguard (SSG) clause in the AoA.  The SSM is meant to be easier, more flexible and 
more effective than the normal safeguard applied under the SSG clause. 
Although all World Trade Organization members have in principle accepted that an SSM 
will be established, some developed countries (particularly the United States) have sought to 
restrict the use of the SSM.   The U.S. would like to see a special safeguard mechanism that has a 
limited number of usages and a limited degree to which any SSM import tariffs can be raised.
145
 
The G-33 maintains the position that the proposals of the U.S. and the EU which have strong 












One of the main deterrents for the EU’s commitment to an SP and SSM agreement has 
been the Common Agriculture Policy.  Once again, this is an example of the influence that 
domestic politics has on win-sets.  The current CAP maintains a large amount of export subsidies 
in many of the products that the G-33 claim should be protected as special products, including 
rice.
147
  These export subsidies are to expire under the CAP in 2013. The G-33 negotiates for the 
complete elimination of export subsidies, as they would negatively affect the products that a 
proposed SP would protect, ultimately negating its purpose.  Due to the terms of the CAP, the 
bargaining of the EU chief negotiator is relatively weak.   
The U.S. and EU have consistently taken the position of their exporting companies whose 
products would be affected by SP and, more particularly, SSM.  Rice has been previously 
identified as one of the proposed special products for the G-33.  On the other hand, the G-33 felt 
that the opposition to a Special Safeguard Mechanism was a US-led campaign against their 
agenda.
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  In addition to the exemption tariffs on Special Products and more flexible options 
from subsidy cuts, developing countries have been reluctant and unwilling to give up their 
additional market access in non-agriculture industries (known as NAMA) to the developed 
countries. The point of view of the U.S. constituents is that SSM would put their exports at an 
even greater disadvantage.  For this reason, SSM has been a hard sell at the U.S. domestic level.  
The G-33 will need to provide some other concessions to U.S. and EU exporters.  Neither the G-
33 nor the U.S. has been willing to make the necessary concessions. 










The EU has maintained a stubborn position on SP and SSM since its introduction at the 
Cancun Round.  The largest step that the EU has made thus far has been a slight increase in cuts 
in domestic support.  However, these cuts were conditional; the cuts would be made only if the 
EU was given increased non-agricultural market access (NAMA) by developing countries.
149
  In 
addition, the EU has requested that it be able to use the special product designation and the 
special safeguards, making SP and SSM available to both the developing and developed 
countries.
150
    
The U.S. and EU have not made the desired changes to SP and SSM that the G-33 would 
see as acceptable.  The U.S. and EU have, however, removed the proposed limit on the number 
of products which the SSM could be applied to per year.  Further G-33 demands required that the 
SSM trigger level be lowered.   The U.S.’s trade-liberalizing agenda continuously seeks 
increased SSM rates. Both the G-33 and the U.S. have narrow win-sets, which make an 
agreement less likely.  
Adjusted Win-sets for Market Access 
Gaining approval from the developing countries of the G-33 level I constituents in the 
area of market access agenda has been difficult.  I believe that the G-33’s proposal offers too few 
concessions for developed nations to allow for approval at home.  The G-33 demands on the 
terms of special products do not allow the U.S. or EU to persuade their constituents to support 
the agreement.    
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Both the United States and the European Union currently benefit from the current market 
access arrangement.  One example of this is offering high quotas to sugar exporters in exchange 
for access.
151
  Under this model, their gains have been great.   
In addition, agreeing to adjust market access under SP and SSM would produce minimum 
win-sets for one side and maximum win-sets for another. Both the U.S. and E.U. believe that 
developing nations could abuse this system to discriminate against foreign trade legitimately 
entering their markets. 
Adjusted SSM 
 
The U.S. and the E.U. have not been able to come to an agreement with the G-33 on the 
condition that developing countries would be allowed to exceed their pre-Doha Round tariff 
commitments if the G-33 position on SSM were applied on top of their post-Doha tariffs.   
Negotiators on both sides face domestic restraints. Susan Schwab, the U.S. chief 
negotiator between 2006 until 2009, was faced with pressure from American exporters that 
aimed to increase their market access.  A low SSM rate would decrease possibilities of increased 
market access.  These relatively small gains and the imbalance between the gains from exports 
and imports explain why the deal on modalities has not attracted active support from 
constituencies in the United States. 
Similarly to U.S. interests in cotton, domestic constituents have been influenced by 
political interest groups in SSM.  The U.S. government was also faced with lobbying to not 
reduce U.S. agricultural subsidies too much.  The agribusiness exporters that dominate the global 
agricultural markets are very active in domestic negotiations. Monsanto, for example, makes 
some ninety percent of the genetically modified seed in commercial use. Cargill, ADM and Zen 
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Noh control over eighty percent of corn sales from the U.S. (which in turn has some forty 
percent of the world corn market).
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  The USTR primarily supports the interest of these 
exporters.  Archer Hill is one of the top agribusiness exporters in the EU. 
The relatively small gains explain why the deal on modalities has not attracted active 
support from pro-trade constituencies in the United States.  As the negotiations currently stand, 
neither side has been willing to accept a narrower win-set than the other.  There was no room for 
compromise nor was either party able to convince the other one to change its win-set. 
Some progress has been made on SP and SSM concessions since the Cancun Ministerial 
nine years past.  The U.S. and the EU have substantially reduced agricultural subsidies 
concerning SP and SSM.
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  The G-33 developing countries could reciprocate by cutting import 
tariffs and lessening the rigidity of the self-designation demand by accepting limits on special 
and differential designation.  The G-33 could increase the possibility of an agreement if they 
were to agree to a limit on the self-designation request. Domestic constituents for U.S. and EU 
chief negotiators will continue to oppose an arrangement that does not control how special 
products are designated or constrained. The G-33 would need to offer a strong concession to alter 
developed country positions.  I believe these concessions would reduce the unwillingness to 
incorporate special and differential treatment of products.  
Member countries of the G-33 believe the self-designation is crucial to supporting their 
development agenda. Without it, the group believes it might lose the security and assurance that 
they would be protected from trade distortion.  If the group were to allow nations outside of the 
G-33 to self-designate as well, this may create an overlap in interests and increase the win-set.  
This would be a feasible option if there were an appropriate limit, uniform to all participants, 








which constrained the amount of products able to be self-designated bi-annually or annually.  
The limitation might offer G-33 the confidence that the self-designation would be controlled thus 
eliminating the possibility that developed nations would abuse it while making it available to 
them.  On the other hand, the arrangement could persuade EU and U.S. to agree on self-
designation under the constrained terms because it would eliminate their concerns that self-
designation gives the G-33 an unfair advantage. Without strengthened support from the EU, the 
G-33 will not be successful in implementing the SP and SSM.   
Additionally, a ceiling that limits the maximum number of SP tariff lines could be 
applied to prevent abuse.  The maximum could be determined per each nation as a percentage of 
all domestically produced agriculture products.  If the G-33 were to agree to a more constrained 
designation process for SP, then it would still allow for the necessary protection from import 
surges, and it might allow for the EU to agree to its implementation and thus expand their win-
set.  In addition, a limited self-designation process could be wagered in exchange for increased 




Single-Undertaking and Singapore Issues 
The single-undertaking is the principal ruling introduced in the Uruguay Round that 
requires members to accept the results of a round as a package.154  The single-undertaking affects 
the terms of a package rule by eliminating the possibility that a country could accept Doha with 
any exceptionality to their interests.  The terms of the Doha Agreement would be uniformly 
applied to all WTO members regardless of their differing needs or strengths and weaknesses 
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within agriculture.  Developing countries, especially those of the G-90 coalition, have had a 
difficult time accepting this ruling because they believe their needs and interests are not reflected 
in the overall package. 
The G-90 could make concessions that shift their interests closer to the interests of the 
U.S. and the EU.  Many of the member countries of the G-90 are vulnerable to U.S. and EU 
pressures since most have some kind of preferential trading arrangement with the two powers.  
The Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific group (ACP) member countries have ratified bilateral 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the EU.   For the U.S., the trading arrangement 
is the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA.)   The EU maintains the Cotonou 
arrangement with ACP nations.
155
    
The four components that make up the Singapore Issues are investment, competition 
policy, government procurement and trade facilitation. Developing countries, including ACP and 
Least Developed Countries (LDC) nations, were adamantly against the inclusion of these issues 
under WTO rules because they believed it would be put them at a competitive disadvantage in 
comparison to industrialized countries.
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 The G-90 is most recognized for challenging the adoption of these Singapore Issues at 
Cancun.  The G-90 offers its concessions in a conditional give-and-take fashion.  The G-90 
would accept the liberalization of developing countries under the condition that they are not 
required to liberalize their markets as well.
157
  Developing countries do not feel they are prepared 
to compete with developed economies and believe that liberalizing their own markets would 
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cause increased trade distortion.  The G-90 agenda includes the demand to end EU export 
subsidies and to increase market access to EU markets.   
Adjusted Win-sets for the Single-Undertaking and The Singapore Issues 
I believe that there are available concessions for the G-90 to make that may enable the 
U.S. and the EU to strike a deal.  The primary recommended concession would require the G-90 
to agree to allow the Singapore Issues to remain on the agenda but outside the “single-
undertaking.”   
Considering that all the members of the Cotton-4 and the G-33 are also members of the 
G-90, the G-90 may take into consideration the changes that have been made by the other two 
groups (assuming the recommended changes have been applied.)  The probability that the G-90 
will have any success in Doha is more likely if, like the Cotton-4 and G-33, the group can offer 
something of interest and value to the U.S. and the EU in exchange for amendments to the 
Singapore and “single-undertaking” issues.   Offering some form of concession may be the only 
way in which developing nations could reach the level of bargaining power needed to change the 
basic decision ruling.    
Modification of the “Single-Undertaking” 
 The G-90s greatest interest in Doha is to stress the importance of the developing 
countries’ needs in the Doha Declaration Round’s decision-making.  I believe that the G-90 can 
achieve their goals through pursuing an altered “single-undertaking.”  Letting go of the 
Singapore Issues may be a necessary step in achieving this.  If the United States and the 
European Union were able to reach an agreement concerning the “single-undertaking,” it may 
enable the G-90 to modify their demands for the Singapore Issues.  It would require that all 




undertaking.”  I believe that an amendment of the “single-undertaking” would be favored by the 
majority of developing countries that often seek an individualized type of arrangement, rather 
than a uniform one for all members.  However, developed countries could stand to lose a 
comparative advantage by altering the “single-undertaking” rule. 
The G-90 will need to compensate by playing to the interests of the U.S. and EU in 
exchange for modifying the “single-undertaking” rule.  In order to ensure that the U.S. and EU 
accept the modified “single-undertaking” proposal, the G-90 should include a supplementary 
incentive that, when combined with the altered “single-undertaking” and the exclusion of 
demands on the Singapore Issues, would reduce the pressure at the U.S. and EU domestic level.  
The proposal alone would require the G-90 to agree that the Singapore Issues could be held 
outside of the AoA.  This supplementary incentive would go a step further to ensure that the U.S. 
and EU feel that they are still benefitting from the modified proposal.  This supplementary 
incentive could be satisfied in the form of a side payment. 
I recommended that the G-90 propose that a side-payment to the U.S. and EU has already 
been made by half of its members.  As previously mentioned, the members of The Cotton-4 and 
the G-33 are also members of the G-90.  If the earlier recommendations for expanding win-sets 
were applied, the G-90 could barter these changes as a concession made by its members.  These 
alterations offer the United States and the EU increased market access and the ability to utilize an 
SP and SSM.  These concessions have already been made by a large portion of the G-90.  It 
would be very difficult to offer a concession from each of the G-90 countries’ markets.  On the 
other hand, settling for the current “one-size-fits-all” arrangement affects each country very 




Therefore, if the many groups within the G-90 come together in opposition to the U.S. 
and the EU and barter the concessions that have already been made to the U.S. and EU by many 
of its member-countries, the U.S. and EU may be in a better bargaining position to accept the 
alterations to the “single-undertaking.”  In addition, modifying the G-90’s demands on the 
Singapore Issues would increase the probability of reaching an agreement and ultimately, the 
probability that the U.S. and EU will accept the G-90 demands for the “single-undertaking.”  
This arrangement would allow win-sets to overlap while increase win-sets for all of the three 
negotiating parties.  
 
Modification of the Singapore Issues 
 If the G-90 are not willing to modify their demands on the Singapore Issues, they could 
offer the same exchange recommended above but replace the “single-undertaking” with the 
Singapore Issues.  Rather than eliminating demands on the Singapore Issues, the G-90 could 
choose to eliminate the “single-undertaking” from their demands.  This arrangement would offer 
the same flexibility and large win-sets for all negotiating parties as the aforementioned 
recommendation, the only difference would be the replacement of the “single-undertaking” with 
the Singapore Issues.  
 There is one area where the benefits of this concession differ.  A concession that removed 
demands on the “single-undertaking” in order to continue pursuing changes in the Singapore 
Issues would require that the EU make an additional concession;  the EU would need to concede 
to either reduce EU export subsidies to G-90 countries, or to increase G-90’s access to enter and 
trade within EU markets.  Exchanging for only one of these demands offers the EU the ability to 




the aforementioned G-90 demands.  On the other hand, modification of the Singapore Issues 
would not change the bargaining position of the G-90.  However, this concession would result in 
a slightly smaller win-set for the European Union relative to a concession concerning the “single-
undertaking.”  Additionally, the elimination of a “single-undertaking” could alter the manner in 
which the Singapore Issues are applied; in other words, it would eradicate the G-90’s demand for 
removing the Singapore Issues as they would not have the liberalizing effects they once had on 
their markets.  For this reason, I believe that an altered “single-undertaking” is better suited for 



















Chapter 5:  Conclusion 
 
In this study, I have focused on the negotiating dynamic of the World Trade Organization 
within the November 2001 Doha Round. The deliberations of eight WTO Ministerial 
Conferences, starting with the September 2003 Cancun Ministerial and ending with the 
December 2012 Geneva Ministerial, have been examined.  In analyzing negotiation outcomes, it 
is important to take the interaction between two levels into account.  Robert D. Putnam’s two-
level analysis recognizes the inevitability of domestic conflicts affecting national interests.  
The Doha Round was intended to address issues of development in agriculture.  It was 
unique to the original agreement because it gave precedence to developing countries that had 
been burdened by trade-distortion under the original Agreement on Agriculture.  For many 
developing nations, trade in agricultural products accounts for the majority of their exports.   The 
Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) is part of the Doha agreement and was the first attempt 
towards an international agriculture policy.   The purpose of the negotiations was to find an 
agreement that promoted the interests of developing nations while still meeting the needs of 
developed nations.  Since then, developing nations have been discontented with the agreement 
itself and frustrated with their inability to impact negotiations at the level of developed nations.   
A failed Doha Agreement would have many consequences, mostly for the developing 
countries.  Among them is the implication of a failed eleven year trade talk for the global 
institution of trade.  The purpose of the WTO is to facilitate fair and equal trade negotiations.  It 
has currently been unable to do so with the Agreement on Agriculture.  In addition, it continues 
to be bypassed via alternative trade agreements including bilateral agreements.  If this trend 




My hypothesis was that only if the coalitions of the developing nations, as well as all the 
parties involved offer specific adjustments to the WTO agenda will there be a successful 
outcome to the negotiations.  Without concessions from both sides, an ultimate agreement is not 
possible.  After thorough examination of the Doha Agreement, as well as the positions of three 
developing country coalitions, the United States and the European Union, I was able to identify 
the possible concessions that can be made by each party.  The constant interaction between 
international and domestic actors (Level I and Level II), and the determinants of large win-sets 
have provided the framework for the hypothesis. 
I believe that the Doha agreement will succeed if the concessions specified in Chapter 4 
are applied for the Cotton-4, the G-33, the G-90, the United States and the European Union.  
There are five recommended concessions within the four issue-areas.  For cotton, concessions 
can be made by the C-4 in opening markets in the non-sensitive automobile and transportation 
industries.  In addition, the C-4 may follow Brazil in bargaining for special protections on cotton.  
The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) ruling in Brazils favor provides the C-4 a 
unique bargaining position with the U.S.   
For market access, the G-33 could concede to adjusting the Special Safeguard 
Mechanism and limits on self-designation.  This would allow the U.S. and the EU to utilize 
Special Products.  Ultimately, these adjustments made by each negotiating party allow the G-33 
and U.S. and EU’s interests to overlap.  In addition, placing a limit on the self-designation would 
create a balance between the negotiating parties’ interests.  The G-33 would still be able to self-
designate but within limitations, and the U.S. and EU would not feel that the G-33 was abusing 




Finally, the G-90 could either remove the Singapore Issues from their demands if the 
U.S. and EU agreed to either modify the “single-undertaking” or it could remove the “single-
undertaking” in order to achieve its demands in the Singapore Issues.  However, applying the 
recommended modification to the “single-undertaking” would change the manner in which the 
WTO rulings affect individual nations.  In turn, the modification would eradicate the need to 
alter the Singapore Issues, as the complaint against the Singapore Issues would already have 
been remedied by the modified “single-undertaking,” making the first option more favorable.  In 
addition, the concessions made by the C-4 and G-33 could be considered a concession made by 
the G-90 as a side-payment to the U.S. and the EU.  The recommended concessions would allow 
the interests of both sides to overlap and expand win-sets.  If both do not at least move towards 
concessions in the upcoming round of negotiations, the negotiations will continue to be 
stalemated or deadlocked. 
International relations theories, including realism and liberalism, aid in supporting the 
hypothesis.  Both realism and liberalism address the concept of international cooperation.  
Liberal concepts of trade have heavily influenced international agriculture commerce and the 
trend to increase market access.  Liberalizing trade, which promotes the elimination of barriers to 
foreign markets, is an interest shared by developed countries.  However, it has had an 
unfavorable impact on developing country economies.  The Doha Development Agenda has not 
been able to maintain cooperation, as realist theories would predict.   
The two-level analysis recognizes the inevitability of domestic conflicts over what the 
national interest requires.  Central decision-makers, or chief negotiators, strive to reconcile 
domestic and international interests. This can result in a strategic opportunity in which a policy is 




dilemma much like realism portrays in the stag hunt.  I believe the latter most accurately depicts 
the two-level game outcomes thus far in the Doha agreement. 
An increased bargaining coalition with overlapping memberships has complicated the 
negotiation processes.  The collaboration among developing coalition groups has forced a change 
in the negotiating dynamic. Coalition building has been a successful and preferred strategy for 
developing nations to increase win-sets.  However, coalitions are not exempt from making 
concessions that coerce domestic level constituents to reach an agreement.  Moving forward, 
developing nations’ coalitions and developed nations must make concessions to create win-sets 
with coinciding interests for both parties.  In addition, an understanding of the interests on both 
the domestic level and international level will make ratification more plausible.   
In addition to accepting the entanglements and constraints of interactions between the 
domestic and international levels, the hypothesis accepts that international cooperation is 
possible. However, cooperation is possible only when international arrangements are mutually 
beneficial and are able to satisfy the national and international interests simultaneously.  The 
two-level analysis recognizes the inevitability of domestic conflicts about what the national 
interests require as well as it recognizes that central decision-makers strive to merge domestic 
and international imperatives at the same time.  The chief negotiators of any multilateral 
agreement must also be mindful of a country’s ratification process.  Ratification procedures are 
unique to each country.  Ratification is the legalization of an agreement; once a country ratifies a 
multilateral treaty, it adopts the new provisions into its national law. 
Win-sets are the set of all possible Level I agreements that would allow for the approval 
of the necessary majority among constituents, or a win, in a vote.  This set of possible 




The win-set of level II can be considered as all possible level I agreements that would gain the 
majority among domestic constituents.  A larger win-set of level II makes agreements on level I 
more likely.  Previous negotiations have failed to reach agreement, in part, because only 
minimum or no win-sets were available. 
There are three determinants of win-set size:  the influence of preferences and coalitions 
of Level II constituents, the Level II political institutions, and the strategy of the Level I 
negotiator. The three determinants of win-set size reveal several limitations in achieving 
maximum win-sets.   In the case of Doha and the C-4, G-33, G-90, U.S. and EU, the influence of 
preferences and coalitions of Level II constituents and the Level II political institutions have had 
a profound impact on the win-set size.  In addition, Putnam’s theory accounts for the influence of 
domestic parties and interest groups. The developed countries’ agribusiness groups represent 
Putnam’s concept of the Level II, or domestic, influences on win-set size. 
It is necessary that cooperative efforts be made to create concessions from all sides if 
there is to be an agreement. The proposed concessions might seem to be large shifts for the 
negotiators involved.  However, these are the kind of shifts in position necessary if an ultimate 
Doha agreement is to be met.   If the recommended win-sets for the Cotton-4, the G-33, the G-90 
and the United States and the European Union are applied, a definitive Doha agreement could 
occur. 
Of the four issue-areas examined against the two-level games framework between 
developing country coalitions and developed countries, the Cotton-4 and the United States 
appear to have the most promising chance of satisfying the domestic and international approval 
needed to reach an agreement.  Throughout the last decade, the Cotton-4 has been very 




the support of the domestic constituents in the four West African nations as well as the United 
States.  With the recommended concessions, the United States gains increased market access into 
the West African automotive and transportation sector.  Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali are 
all in need of a more efficient transportation system and the U.S. is in need of increasing its 
market share in the global automobile market.  This recommendation renders both the C-4 and 
the U.S.  large win-sets in cotton.  In addition, the C-4 could strengthen their bargaining position 
by aligning with Brazil in their victory against the U.S. cotton sector.  Doing so would increase 
the likelihood that the C-4’s demands become part of the Doha agreement. 
The G-33 has committed to pursuing the needs of the developing countries that rely on 
agricultural trade.  If the G-33 were to demonstrate some flexibility towards limiting time-frames 
and allocation of products to SP or SSM, greater possibilities would exist for achieving the win-
sets between the two negotiating countries.  In turn, an agreement may be possible.  Therefore, I 
believe that the recommended concessions in an adjusted SSM and the limiting of the self-
designation (in addition to allowing the U.S. and EU to employ self-designation) render larger 
win-sets for each negotiating party.  The adjusted win-sets for safeguards and the use of 
safeguards and self-designation make an agreement more appealing to the U.S. and the EU, yet 
still meet the needs and interests of the G-33.  If applied, these recommended concessions would 
increase the possibility of completing and concluding the Doha agreement. 
Side payments have been useful in shifting interests in multilateral negotiations.  Though 
I do not believe any side agreements would be necessary for Cotton win-sets, side payments 
could further the likelihood of an agreement for the G-90. Side payments are an effective 




sets.  In other words, side payments can be the final method of persuasion that allows domestic 
level voters to collaborate with an international agenda.   
Although G-90 members consist of the world’s smallest countries with considerably 
limited resources, the group represents a significant number of WTO members.  The “single-
undertaking” rule was designed to encourage countries to make tough calls in one area in the 
belief that this would allow for gains elsewhere.  This rule has limited outcomes that are unable 
to exceed minimum win-sets for the G-90.  I believe that pursuing the “single-undertaking” rule 
would achieve the G-90’s goals for an increased developing country voice in the Doha 
agreement.  To gain the acceptance of the U.S. and the EU on altering the “single-undertaking,” 
the two developed countries should remove the Singapore Issues from its demands.  Arguing for 
both the “single-undertaking” and the Singapore Issues weakens the groups bargaining power 
against the developed countries. Though it has been a significant point of interest for the G-90, 
an altered “single-undertaking” rule would benefit them more than altering the Singapore Issues.  
Furthermore, negotiating the concessions made by group members of the C-4 and the G-33 as a 
side-payment to the U.S. and EU could increase the win-sets of the G-90 and they still can feel 
that they are walking away gaining something from the U.S. and EU.  
 Agriculture trade plays a great role in individual country markets as well as international 
markets.  This trade impacts all nations because all nations physically and economically survive 
off their products.  The stakes are too high to let go of the years of investment put into making a 
development agenda work to the benefit of all.  However, the significance of the agriculture 
industry for the economy of any nation also makes determining a mutually-beneficial agreement 




negotiations in the WTO.  If the recommended concessions are made the Doha discussions has a 


























Anderson, Kym.  Martin, Will, “Agriculture trade reform and the Doha agenda” The World 
Economy, 28(9), 2005. 1-40. 
Avery, William P. "Domestic interests in NAFTA Bargaining." Political Science Quarterly, 
113.2 (1998): 281-305. 
 
Baffes, John.  “Cotton Subsidies, The WTO, and the ‘Cotton Problem.” The World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 5663. May 20111-27 
Bello, Walden. Kwa, Aileen.  “Guide to the Agreement on Agriculture:  Technicalities and Trade 
Tricks Explained”, Focus on the Global South, 
1998.www.focusweb.org/publications/1998/AOA.pdf 
Cho, Sungjoon. "A Bridge Too Far: The Fall of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in 
Cancun and the Future of Trade Constitution." Journal of International Economic Law, 7.2 
(2004): 219-244. 
Clapp, Jennifer.  “WTO Agriculture Negotiations:  implications for the Global South” Third 
World Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 4, (2006) 563-577. 
Clapp, Jennifer "WTO Agriculture Negotiations and the Global South:  The WTO after Hong 
Kong.” Routledge, (2007): 37-55. 
Clapp, Jennifer, “Developing Countries and the WTO Agriculture Negotiations” (March 2006). 
CIGI Working Paper No. 6. 1-32. 
Evans, Peter, Jacobson Harold, and Putnam, Robert, Double-Edged Diplomacy: International 
Bargaining and Domestic Politics. (Berkeley) University of California Press 1993, 1-423. 
European Commission, “The Common Agriculture Policy:  A Partnership Between Europe and 
Farmers” Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2012 
European Union, “Not just Farming” http://europa.eu/pol/agr/index_en.htm  Retrieved 09/29/13. 
Food and Agriculture Organization, “WTO Agreement on Agriculture:  The Implementation 
Experience.”  Developing Country Case Studies, (Rome:FAO, 2003). 
Fautrel, Vincent ‘The Way Forward After Hong Kong’ The Technical Centre for Agricultural 
and Rural Cooperation.  The Netherlands, 2006. 





Grieco, Joseph M. “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest 
Liberal Institutionalism” International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer, 1988), pp. 485-
507. 
G-33, “G-33 Press Statement”, Geneva (October 11,2005).  
http://agtradepolicy.org/output/resource/G33StatementOct05.pdf  Retrieved 1/21/13. 
International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development, “Cotton: African exporters seek 
subsidy freeze.” Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, (16 November 2011) 15:39.  1-19. 
International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development. “Special Products and the Special 
Safeguard Mechanism: Strategic Options for Developing Countries.”  Agricultural Trade and 
Sustainable Development Series.  Issue Paper 6. 1-28. 
 
International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development. “Simulations On The Special 
Safeguard Mechanism:  A Look At The December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities.”  Bridges 
Weekly Trade News Digest, (April 2010) 1-22. 
Ismail, Faizel, “Is the Doha Round Dead? What is the Way Forward?” Brooks World Poverty 
Institute Working Paper (May 21, 2012) 167. 1-47. 
Jackson, John. “The Puzzle of GATT: Legal Aspects of a Surprising Institution.” Journal of 
World Trade Law, (1967) 1(2): 1-139. 
 
Kanaga, Raja. “G-33 Stresses Development Mandate, importance of SP/SSM.”  Third World 
Network, (December 1 2009) 1-2. 
 
K. von Moltke.  “Negotiating Subsidy Reduction in the World Trade Organisation” International 
Institute for Sustainable Development, (September 2003) 1-26. 
 
Keohane, Robert O. Multilateralism:  An Agenda for Research” International Journal, 45:4 
(Autumn 1990) 731-764. 
Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. “Realism and complex Interdependence.” Power and 
Interdependence:  World Politics in Transition, (Boston, Little, Brown, 1977) 1-318. 
Kerneis, Pascal “Under The Influence.”  Action Aid.  London, UK.  (January 2006) 1-13.  
http://www.actionaid.org.uk/doc_lib/174_6_under_the_influence_final.pdf Retrieved April 12, 
2012.  
Kherallas, Mylene.  Delgado, Christopher.  Gabre-Madhin.  Minot, Nicholas.  Johnson, Michael. 
“Reforming Agricultural Markets in Africa.”  Johns Hopkins University Press. Washington, D.C. 
(2002)   




Krugman, Paul.  “The Uncomfrotable Truth About Nafta:  It’s Foreign Policy, Stupid.” Foreign 
Affairs.  (November/December 1993)  1-5. 
Krugman, Paul.  “The Move Towards Free Trade Zones.” The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas 
City:  Economic Review, (December 1991) 5-25. 
Ku, Charlotte and Deihl, Paul.  International Law:  Classic and Contemporary Readings, Lynne 
Reinner Publishers.  Boulder, CO:  (2009) 
Moravcik, Andrew.  “Taking Preferences Seriously:  A Liberal Theory of International Politics.”  
International Organizations.  51:4 (1997) 524-527. 
Moravcsik, Andrew. Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. 
(1993): 3-42. 
National Cotton Council of America, “Cotton Policy Begins with Interest Organizations” 
http://www.cotton.org/about/structure/index.cfm  Retrieved November 1, 2012. 
Narlikar, Amrita.  “Bargaining over the Doha Development Agenda:  coalitions in the world 
Trade Organization” Series LATIN Papers, (2006) 1-34. 
Narlikar, Amrita.  Tussie, Diana.  “The G20 at the Cancun Ministerial:  Developing Countries 
and Their Evolving Coalitions in the WTO”  World Economy, 27:7 Oxford, U.K. (2004)  947-
966. 
 
Oduwole, Jumoke.  “An Appraisal of Developing Country Coalition Strategy in the WTO Doha 
Round Agriculture Negotiations” Society of International Economic Law, 3rd Biennial Global 
Conference. (July 10, 2012) 
 
Orden, David.  Blandford,David, Josling, Tim. Brink, Lars. “WTO Disciplines on Agricultural 
Support – Experience to Date and Assessment of Doha Proposals.”  International Food Policy 
Research Institute.  Washington, D.C.  (May 2011) 1-8 
Page, Sheila.  “Doing Doha for Development:  A Development Perspective.” Paper prepared for 
Conference on Development, Sustainability, and Finance:  The Role of the G8 and the 
Gleneagles Summit, 29-30 June 2005, Glasgow. 
Patel, Mayur "New faces in the green room: developing country coalitions and decision-making 
in the WTO." Global Economic Governance Programme Working Paper 33 (2007) 1-37. 
Putnam, Robert D.  “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”  
International Organization.  MIT Press Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer, 1988) 
Rice, Tim, Green, Duncan, Wiggerthale, Marita, and Reichert, Tobias.  “Post-Cancun 
Reflections on Agriculture:  Joint NGO Submission to the European Commission”  Action Aid.  




Ruggie, John Gerrard “Multilateralism:  The Anatomy of an Institution” Cambridge University 
Press, New York (1993) 
Schwab, Susan.  “After Doha:  Why Negotiations Are Doomed and What We Should Do About 
It” Foreign Affairs. (May/June 2011)  90:3 1-20. 
Shiva, Vandana Stolen Harvest: The Hijacking of the Global Food Supply. Cambridge: South 
End Press (2000) 
Snyder, Glenn H. and Diesing, Paul, “Conflict among Nations:  Bargaining, Decision Making, 
and System Structure in International Crises” Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. (1977) 
World Trade Organization, Sectoral Initiative in Favor of Cotton, Joint Proposal by Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali, (16 May 2003) TN/AG/GEN/4 
United States Trade Representative, “United States, “Cotton Four” Countries Celebrate New 
U.S. Cotton Initiatives, Continued Partnership at 8th WTO Ministerial Conference” Geneva, 
Switzerland.  (December 2011) <http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-
releases/2011/december/united-states-%E2%80%9Ccotton-four%E2%80%9D-countries-
celebrate-n> Retrieved November 6, 2012. 
U.S. Commercial Service “Doing Business with Benin:  2012 Country Commercial Guide for 
U.S. Companies”  http://www.buyusainfo.net/docs/x_7126086.pdf   Retrieved April 15, 2013. 
 
U.S. Commercial Service “Doing Business with Mali:  2011 Country Commercial Guide for 
U.S. Companies”   http://www.buyusainfo.net/docs/x_4908410.pdf  Retrieved April 15, 2013. 
 
U.S. Commercial Service “Doing Business with Chad:  2012 Country Commercial Guide for 
U.S. Companies”   http://www.buyusainfo.net/docs/x_8786550.pdf  Retrieved April 15, 2013. 
 
Viotti, Paul R. and Kauppi, Mark.  International Relations Theory. New York:  Longman, Vol 5. 
(2012) 240-36978 
 
Von Braun, Joachim.  Gulati, Ashok.  Orden, David. “Making Agriculture Trade Work for the 
Poor.”  WTO Symposium:  Multilateralism at a Crossroads,  Geneva  (May 25, 2004)  1-8.   
 
World Trade Organization, Agreement on Agriculture.  Part IV:  Article 6 “Domestic Support 
Commitments”, Paragraph 1- 5. 
 
World Trade Organization, Agriculture Negotiations:  Background Fact Sheet 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm  Retrieved March 2012. 
 
World Trade Organization, Doha Explained 





World Trade Organization, The GATT Years:  From Havana to Marrakesh 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm Retrieved November 6, 2012. 
 
World Trade Organization, Geneva Ministerial 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min09_e/min09_e.htm Retrieved October 12, 
2012. 
 
World Trade Organization Trade Negotiations Committee, Address by President Blaise 
Compaore of Burkina Faso “On the Cotton Submission by west and central African countries to 
the Trade Negotiations Committee of the World Trade Organization.” Geneva, 10 June 2003. 
 
Zoellick, Robert. “OpEd:  ‘America Will Not Wait for the Wont-do Countries.” The Financial 
Times, Sept 22, 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
